

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS**

MARIA MUNOZ and SANDRA SMILING,
individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois
corporation,

Defendant.

Case No.

CLASS ACTION

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Maria Munoz and Sandra Smiling (“Plaintiffs”), by and through undersigned counsel, bring this class action, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“Defendant”) and allege as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. This class action lawsuit arises from Defendant’s deceptive, fraudulent, and unfair scheme through which Defendant systematically undervalues total-loss vehicles in order to arbitrarily reduce the ultimate payment to insureds who make total loss claims under insurance policies issued by Defendant.

2. In the event of a “total loss” to an insured vehicle—*i.e.*, where repair of the vehicle is impossible or uneconomical—Defendant’s uniform insurance policies with Plaintiff and all putative Class members (defined below) promises to pay for the loss, limited to the actual cash value (“ACV”) of the vehicle. Attached as **Exhibit A** is a copy of Plaintiff Munoz’s Policy

(“Policy”), which is materially identical to the policy that provides coverage to all members of the putative Class (defined below). Attached as **Exhibit B** is a copy of Plaintiff Smiling’s Policy.

3. Defendant ignores and avoids its straightforward contractual obligation by directing its third-party vendor to systematically reduce total loss evaluations. Specifically, to the amount of Defendant’s total-loss payments, Defendant’s third-party vendor identifies the price of comparable vehicles listed for sale in the relevant market. *After* the vendor determines the value of the comparable vehicles, Defendant instructs its vendor to apply an arbitrary and baseless flat-rate adjustment to the value of each “comparable vehicle,” which Defendant and its vendor call a “typical negotiation adjustment.”

4. The “typical negotiation adjustment” is not based on any negotiations, typical or otherwise, and is not based on any market realities. Rather the “typical negotiation adjustment” ranges from 4-11% of the value of the “comparable vehicle.” The vehicles with lesser value are subject to a greater percentage reduction, with the percentage adjustment becoming lower as the value of the “comparable vehicles” increases. This percentage reduction artificially reduces the total-loss payment for the totaled vehicle and, with the sliding percentage scale, ensures that every total loss payment Defendant makes to insureds is significantly, but unconscionably, reduced.

5. An integral part of Defendant’s fraudulent scheme is a provision of the Policy which requires the parties to submit to an appraisal of the loss if there is a disagreement over the ACV. The appraisal provision requires the insured and the insurer to each hire, at their own expense, an appraiser, and to bear equally the expenses of an umpire selected by the two appraisers, as well as any other expenses of the appraisal. Since the amount by which the insureds’ total-loss claims are underpaid is likely less (or only marginally greater) than the cost of the appraisal, Defendant knows and intends that the insureds will forego the appraisal process and accept the

artificially determined loss-payment for the total-loss claims. As designed by Defendant, the appraisal provision prevents plaintiff and the Class from effectively vindicating their rights under the Policy.

6. To be clear, this case does not present a dispute about ACV, which Defendant never determines. Rather, this case challenges Defendant's systematic and fraudulent scheme to misvalue insureds' vehicles that are declared a total loss in a manner which does not comport with representations made by Defendant or obligations undertaken by Defendant in its Policies, in order to illegally increase its own profits. This is an issue that cannot be resolved through an appraisal process.

7. Moreover, the Policy is an unconscionable contract of that was unilaterally drafted by Defendant with full knowledge of the unfair scheme it intended to employ to artificially reduce the value of its insured's vehicles, and neither Plaintiffs nor the members of the Class had any roll in drafting its terms.

8. Through Defendant's deceptive, fraudulent, and unfair scheme, Defendant violated consumer protection laws, including the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1, *et seq.*, breached its contracts and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing with its insureds, and was unjustly enriched.

9. As a result of Defendant's deceptive, fraudulent, and unfair scheme, Plaintiffs did not receive the benefit of the bargain, and thus sustained actual damages.

10. By this action, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the Class, seek damages and injunctive and declaratory relief.

PARTIES

A. Plaintiffs

11. Plaintiff Maria Munoz, at all relevant times, was an Illinois citizen. Munoz owned a 2020 Ford Escape that was insured under a Policy issued by Defendant, which was deemed a total loss on or around February 13, 2021. Munoz made a claim with Defendant for the total loss of the vehicle. Defendant provided a total loss valuation to Munoz for the total loss claim. Defendant based its offer upon a valuation report obtained from Audatex. Defendant valued Munoz's total loss claim at \$26,067.00. The market valuation report listed values of four different comparable vehicles and shows that Defendant and its vendor applied a "typical negotiation adjustment" of approximately 4% to all comparable vehicles without itemizing or explaining the basis of each adjustment and/or how the value of the deduction was determined. *See* Munoz's Market Value Report at 6-7, attached as **Exhibit C**.

12. Plaintiff Sandra Smiling, at all relevant times, was a North Carolina citizen. Smiling owned a 2014 Nissan Altima that was insured under a Policy issued by Defendant, which was deemed a total loss on or around August 1, 2019. Smiling made a claim with Defendant for the total loss of the vehicle. Defendant provided a total loss valuation to Smiling for the total loss claim. Defendant based its offer upon a valuation report obtained from Audatex. Defendant valued Smiling's total loss claim at \$5,181.00 and paid that amount. The market valuation report listed values of four different comparable vehicles and shows that Defendant and its vendor applied a "typical negotiation adjustment" of approximately 6-8% to all comparable vehicles without itemizing or explaining the basis of each adjustment and/or how the value of the deduction was determined. *See* Smiling's Market Value Report at 5-6, attached as **Exhibit D**.

B. Defendant

13. Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company is an Illinois company with its principal place of business in Illinois. Defendant provides insurance coverage throughout the United States for first-party property damage under collision and/or comprehensive coverage.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

14. This Court has jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant conducts business in Illinois and has its principal place of business in Illinois.

15. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this litigation because Defendant “contract[ed] to insure [a] person, property or risk located within this State at the time of contracting.” 753 ILCS 5/2-209(a)(4).

16. Venue is proper in this Court because a substantial portion of the conduct at issue in this lawsuit took place and had an effect in Cook County.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

“Typical Negotiation”

17. When valuing total-loss automobile claims, insurance companies like Defendant use third party companies to determine and pay the ACV of an insured’s totaled vehicle subject only to reduction for any policy deductible.

18. To avoid full payment under its policies, Defendant has devised a blatant and unlawful scheme to reduce its total-loss payments to insureds, by use of a deceptive, arbitrary and baseless “typical negotiation adjustment.”

19. Specifically, Defendant purports to determine the ACV of total-loss vehicles via a third-party vendor, Audatex or AudaExplore, through a system called Autosource Market-Driven Valuation (“Autosource”). The Autosource system identifies the price of comparable vehicles sold

or listed for sale online in the relevant market. Autosource then, at Defendant's directive, applies a deceptive and arbitrary "typical negotiation adjustment" to the value of the comparable vehicles before determining the total-loss payment Defendant will make.

20. Defendant's "typical negotiation adjustment" is arbitrary and unsupportable. When offering the total-loss payment to an insured whose car was totaled, Defendant represents that the "typical negotiation adjustment" reflects some sort of average difference between a dealer list price and "what the dealer would be willing" to sell it for. *See* Ex. B at 5 ("The selling price *may* be substantially less than the asking price. When indicated, the asking price has been adjusted to account for typical negotiation according to each comparables [sic] price."). However, this disclosure is never made prior to determining the total-loss payment Defendant will make.

21. Moreover, the across-the-board 4-11% reduction on used vehicles' internet prices is based on no negotiations, typical or otherwise, and does not reflect market realities, and neither relevant state insurance laws and regulations nor the Policy permit Defendant to make this arbitrary deduction. Indeed, Defendant applies the "typical negotiation adjustment" without contacting the identified dealerships or sellers, or considering whether the online retailer ever discounts its vehicles. Notably, in applying a universal percentage-based "typical negotiation adjustment" reduction, Defendant failed to consider that it is increasingly the practice in the used car market to avoid price negotiation by implementing "no haggle" pricing, particularly as to internet-posted prices.¹ Indeed, in addition, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the related supply

¹ *See, e.g.*, <https://www.autonationlincolnclearwater.com/autonation-one-price.htm> (last visited Sept. 24, 2021) ("Not only is our no-haggle price low, it's guaranteed."); <https://www.carmax.com/about-carmax> (last visited May September 26, 2021) ("our 'no-haggle' prices transformed car buying and selling from a stressful, dreaded event into the honest, straightforward experience all people deserve.").

chain problems with parts such as electronics for vehicles, used cars have been selling for a premium, with sale price typically *increasing* from posted price if it changes at all.²

22. Rather, the arbitrary “typical negotiation adjustment,” ranging from 4-11% of the value of the comparable vehicle is keyed only to the value of that vehicle, as the value of the “comparable vehicles” increases. This sliding percentage scale does not reflect “actual value” of the vehicle vehicles or any “typical negotiation,” but rather is meant to ensure that Defendant’s total loss payments are significantly reduced, even when a vehicle is not valuable.

23. Plaintiffs do not contest the vehicles Defendant selected to use as comparable vehicles. Plaintiffs do not contest Defendant’s representations of the listed price of comparable vehicles. Plaintiffs do not contest the value assigned to differences in trim, condition, mileage, packages, and equipment between comparable vehicles and the total-loss vehicle. What Plaintiffs contest is that Defendant instructed Audatex to apply arbitrary, capricious, and invalid “typical negotiation” adjustment across-the-board in determining its total-loss payments.

Defendant’s Deceptive and Unfair Appraisal Process

24. An integral part of Defendant’s fraudulent scheme is a provision of Policy which requires the parties to submit to an appraisal if there is a disagreement over the ACV (which Defendant never determines). The appraisal provision requires the insured and the insurer to each hire, at their own expense, an appraiser and to bear equally the expenses of an umpire selected by the two appraisers, as well as any other expenses of the appraisal. Since the amount by which the insureds’ total-loss claims are underpaid is likely less than the cost of the appraisal, Defendant

² See <https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/07/used-car-prices-to-stay-high-until-automakers-fix-production-issues.html> (last visited Sept. 16, 2021); <https://abc7chicago.com/car-chip-shortage-2021-prices-auto-gm-closes-factories/11005980/> (last visited Sept. 16, 2021).

knows that the insureds will forego the appraisal process and accept the artificially reduced ACV of the vehicle for their total-loss claims. As designed, the appraisal clause prevents plaintiff and the Class from effectively vindicating their statutory and common law causes of action.

25. To be clear, this case does not present a dispute about ACV, which Defendant never determines. Rather, this case challenges Defendant's fraudulent scheme to illegally undervalue insureds' vehicles that are declared a total loss, in order to increase its own profits. This is an issue that cannot be resolved through an appraisal process that is part of that very scheme.

26. Moreover, the Policy is an unconscionable contract of that was unilaterally drafted by Defendant with full knowledge of the unfair scheme it intended to employ to artificially reduce the value of its insured's vehicles, and neither Plaintiffs nor the members of the Class had any roll in drafting its terms.

APPLICATION OF ILLINOIS LAW NATIONWIDE

27. The application of Illinois law as the substantive basis for relief for Defendant's violations of the rights of Plaintiffs and each of the members of the proposed national class (as opposed to interpretation of the insurance policies) is appropriate because Illinois retains the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.

28. Defendant's principal place of business is in Illinois, and Defendant's deceptive scheme was developed in, and emanated from, Illinois.

29. The form insurance Policies Defendant used to carry out its scheme were developed and drafted in Illinois.

30. Illinois has a strong interest in regulating the conduct of companies headquartered in Illinois, particularly when they engage in fraud on a systematic and national level.

31. The application of Illinois law to a national class will not present any difficulty.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

32. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P 23(a) and (b), on behalf of the following proposed Multistate Class (“Multistate Class):

All persons insured by Defendant in any state who, from the earliest allowable time through the date of resolution of this action, received a first-party total loss valuation and payment on an automobile total loss claim that included a “typical negotiation” or similarly-titled adjustment.

33. If necessary, and in the alternative, Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of the following proposed State Subclasses:

The Illinois Subclass. All Illinois citizens insured by Defendant who, from the earliest allowable time through the date of resolution of this action, received a first-party total loss valuation and payment on an automobile total loss claim that included a “typical negotiation” or similarly-titled adjustment.

The North Carolina Subclass. All North Carolina citizens insured by Defendant who, from the earliest allowable time through the date of resolution of this action, received a first-party total loss valuation and payment on an automobile total loss claim that included a “typical negotiation” or similarly-titled adjustment.

34. Unless otherwise stated, the Multistate Class and the alternative State Subclasses are collectively referred to as the “Class.”

35. Excluded from the Class are Defendant and any of its members, affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, officers, directors, employees, successors, or assigns; governmental entities; and the Judge(s) and Court staff assigned to this case and their immediate family members.

36. Plaintiffs reserve their right to amend the Class definitions if discovery and further investigation reveal that any Class should be expanded or narrowed, divided into additional subclasses under Rule 23(c)(5), or modified in any other way

37. **Numerosity.** The members of the Class are so numerous that individual joinder of all Class members is impracticable. While Plaintiffs are informed and believe that there are thousands of Class members, the precise number is unknown to Plaintiffs but may be ascertained from Defendant's books and records. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by recognized Court-approved notice dissemination methods, which may include U.S. Mail, electronic mail, Internet postings, and/or published notice.

38. **Commonality and Predominance.** This action involves common questions of law and fact, which predominate over any questions affecting individual Class members, including, without limitation:

- a. whether Defendant's practice of applying a "typical negotiation adjustment" in determining total-loss payments results is a breach of its obligation to pay ACV;
- b. whether Defendant's failure to disclose its use and use of a "typical negotiation adjustment" when determining total-loss payments for a totaled vehicle until such an assessment is made is deceptive to a reasonable consumer, unconscionable or otherwise a violation of the relevant consumer protection statute(s);
- c. whether Defendant's practice of applying a "typical negotiation adjustment" in determining total-loss payments results is a breach of its obligation to pay ACV breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing it has with Plaintiffs and the other Class members;
- d. Whether Defendant was unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff and the other Class members as a result of its conduct
- e. whether Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to injunctive relief based on Defendant's conduct; and

- f. whether Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to damages and the measure of damages owed to them.

39. **Typicality.** Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the other Class members' claims because Defendant undertook the same practice of applying a "typical negotiation adjustment" in determining total-loss payments under materially similar policy provisions requiring payment of ACV. Plaintiffs' claims are based upon the same legal theories as those of the other Class members. Plaintiffs and the other Class members sustained damages as a direct and proximate result of the same wrongful practices in which Defendant engaged. Plaintiffs' claims arise from the same practices and course of conduct that give rise to the claims of the other Class members.

40. **Adequacy of Representation.** Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Class because Plaintiffs' interests do not conflict with the interests of the other Class members whom they seek to represent, Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, including successfully litigating class action cases similar to this one, where insurers breached contracts with insureds. The interests of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiffs and their counsel.

41. **Superiority.** A class action is superior to any other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, and no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action. The damages or other financial detriment suffered by Plaintiffs and the other Class members are relatively small compared to the burden and expense that would be required to individually litigate their claims against Defendant, such that it would be impracticable for the Class members to individually seek redress for Defendant's wrongful conduct. Even if the Class members could afford litigation, the court system could not. Individualized litigation creates a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments and

increases the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties, and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court.

I. CAUSES OF ACTION ASSERTED ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONWIDE CLASS

COUNT 1

**VIOLATION OF THE ILLINOIS CONSUMER FRAUD
AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ACT 815 ILCS, 505/1, *et seq.***

42. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all previously alleged paragraphs as if fully alleged herein.

43. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the Multistate Class (for purposes of this Count, the “Class”).

44. Defendant, Plaintiffs, and the Class members are “persons” within the meaning of 815 ILCS 505/1(c).

45. Plaintiffs and the Class members are “consumers” within the meaning of 815 ILCS 505/1(e).

46. Defendant was and is engaged in “trade” or “commerce” within the meaning of 815 ILCS 505/1(f).

47. The Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“Illinois CFA”) prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact . . . in the conduct of trade or commerce . . . whether any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby.” 815 ILCS 505/2.

48. As alleged herein, Defendant, through its agents, employees, and/or subsidiaries, violated the Illinois CFA by knowingly and intentionally concealing and failing to disclose material facts regarding its application of an arbitrary “typical negotiation adjustment” to comparable vehicles in order to reduce their market value and, as a result, the amount of Defendant’s ACV payment to insureds, as detailed above.

49. By knowingly and intentionally misrepresenting, omitting, concealing, and failing to disclose material facts regarding its application of an arbitrary “typical negotiation adjustment” to comparable vehicles, as detailed above, Defendant engaged in one or more unfair or deceptive business practices prohibited by the Illinois CFA.

50. Defendant’s misrepresentations and omissions regarding its application of an arbitrary “typical negotiation adjustment” to comparable vehicles were made to Plaintiffs and the Class members in a uniform manner.

51. Defendant’s unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including its misrepresentations, concealments, omissions, and suppression of material facts, as alleged herein, had a tendency or capacity to mislead and create a false impression in consumers’ minds, and were likely to and, in fact, did deceive reasonable consumers, including Plaintiffs and the Class members, about Defendant’s application of an arbitrary “typical negotiation adjustment” to comparable vehicles in order to reduce the amount of Defendant’s total-loss payments to its insureds.

52. The facts regarding Defendant’s application of an arbitrary “typical negotiation adjustment” to comparable vehicles that Defendant knowingly and intentionally misrepresented, omitted, concealed, and/or failed to disclose would be considered material by a reasonable consumer, and they were, in fact, material to Plaintiffs and the Class members, who consider such facts to be important to their purchase decisions with respect to Defendant’s insurance coverage.

53. Plaintiffs and Class members had no way of discerning that Defendant's representations were false and misleading, or otherwise learning the facts that Defendant had concealed or failed to disclose. Plaintiffs and Class members did not, and could not, unravel Defendant's deception on their own.

54. Defendant had an ongoing duty to Plaintiffs and the Class members to refrain from engaging in unfair or deceptive practices under the Illinois CFA in the course of its business. Specifically, Defendant owed Plaintiff and Class members a duty to disclose all the material facts concerning its application of an arbitrary "typical negotiation adjustment" to comparable vehicles because Defendant possessed exclusive knowledge of those facts, it intentionally concealed those facts from Plaintiffs and the Class members, and/or it made misrepresentations that were rendered misleading because they were contradicted by withheld facts.

55. Plaintiffs and the Class members were aggrieved by Defendant's violations of the Illinois CFA because they suffered ascertainable loss and actual damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's knowing and intentional misrepresentations, omissions, concealments, and failures to disclose material facts regarding its application of an arbitrary "typical negotiation" to comparable vehicles, including that the "typical negotiation adjustment" is arbitrarily selected and applied in an inconsistent manner designed to decrease Defendant's total-loss payments under the Policy.

56. Plaintiffs and the Class members purchased Defendant's insurance coverage in reliance on Defendant's misrepresentations, omissions, concealments, and/or failures to disclose material facts regarding its promise to pay ACV in the event of a total loss and Defendant's application of an arbitrary "typical negotiation adjustment" to comparable vehicles to artificially reduce its total-loss payments to insureds.

57. Had Defendant not engaged in the deceptive acts and practices alleged herein, Plaintiffs and Class members would not have purchased insurance coverage from Defendant, or would not have paid as much for such coverage and, thus, they did not receive the benefit of the bargain and/or they suffered out-of-pocket loss.

58. Defendant's violations of the Illinois CFA present a continuing risk of future harm to Plaintiffs and the Class members.

59. Plaintiffs and the Class members seek an order enjoining Defendant's unfair and deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Illinois CFA and awarding actual damages, costs, attorneys' fees, and any other just and proper relief available under the Illinois CFA.

COUNT 2

BREACH OF CONTRACT

60. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all previously alleged paragraphs, except those allegations made under the preceding Count, as if fully alleged herein.

61. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the Multistate Class (for purposes of this Count, the "Class").

62. Plaintiffs and each of the other Class members were insured under a policy issued by Defendant, as described herein.

63. Plaintiffs and each of the other Class members made claims under their insurance contracts, which Defendant determined to be first-party total losses under the insurance contract, and additionally determined to be covered claims.

64. Pursuant to the above-described contractual provisions, upon the total loss of their insured vehicles, Defendant purported to pay Plaintiffs and each of the other Class members the ACV of their totaled vehicles.

65. Defendant, however, failed to pay the ACV of Plaintiffs' and Class members' vehicles because Defendant applied an arbitrary and capricious "typical negotiation adjustment"—and, in some cases, ordered the adjustments solely based on disadvantaging insureds and advantaging Defendant—to comparable vehicles in order to reduce their market value and, as a result, Defendant's total-loss payments to insureds.

66. Thus, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and each of the other Class members the promised ACV of their total-loss vehicles and thereby breached its contract with Plaintiffs and each of the other Class members.

67. As a result of such contractual breaches, Plaintiffs and each of the other Class members have been damaged and are entitled to recover damages, as well as costs, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, injunctive relief, and other relief as appropriate.

COUNT 3

BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

68. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all previously alleged paragraphs, except those allegations made under the preceding Counts, as if fully alleged herein.

69. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the Multistate Class (for purposes of this Count, the "Class").

70. Every contract, including the Policy, contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The purpose of this duty is to ensure that parties do not take advantage of each other in a way that could not have been contemplated at the time the contract was drafted or do anything that will destroy the other party's right to receive the benefit of the contract.

71. Disputes involving the exercise of good faith arise when one party is given broad discretion in performing its obligations under the contract. Where a contract specifically vests one

of the parties with broad discretion in performing a term of the contract, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that the discretion be exercised reasonably and with proper motive, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties.

72. Under the Policy, Defendant had discretion to perform its obligations under the contract, including the obligation to determine the ACV of an insured's total-loss vehicle.

73. Defendant, however exercised its discretion unreasonably, with an improper motive, and in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties, specifically, to arbitrarily reduce the amount of its total-loss payments to insureds, as alleged herein.

74. As such, Defendant breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by, *inter alia*:

- a. Intentionally applying "typical negotiation adjustments" to undervalue comparable vehicles, and, in turn, insureds' total-loss vehicles;
- b. Failing to pay insureds the ACV of their total-loss vehicles;
- c. Interpreting the terms and conditions of its insurance policies in an unreasonable manner solely in an effort to understate the value of total-loss vehicles and avoid paying insureds the ACV on their total-loss claims;
- d. Inventing spurious grounds for undervaluing total-loss claims that are hidden, not specific in dollar amount, not adequately explained, and unreasonable.

75. Defendant's breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing have caused damages to Plaintiffs and the Class. Plaintiffs' and the Class members' damages include the amounts improperly deducted by Defendant from their payments to insureds on the basis of a typical negotiation adjustment.

COUNT 4

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

76. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all previously alleged paragraphs, except those allegations made under the preceding Counts, as if fully alleged herein.

77. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the Multistate Class.

78. Plaintiffs plead this claim separately as well as in the alternative to their other claims, as without such claims they would have no adequate legal remedy.

79. Defendant requested and received a monetary benefit at the expense of Plaintiffs and Class members in the form of premium payments for automobile insurance coverage.

80. If Defendant had not misrepresented, omitted, concealed, and/or failed to disclose material facts regarding its promise to pay ACV in the event of a total loss, specifically Defendant's application of an arbitrary "typical negotiation adjustment" to comparable vehicles to artificially reduce its total-loss payments to insureds, Plaintiffs and the Class members either would not have purchased insurance through Defendant, or they would have paid less for such insurance coverage.

81. Accordingly, Defendant was unjustly enriched by the premiums paid by Plaintiffs and the Class members to the detriment of Plaintiffs and the Class members.

82. Plaintiffs and the Class members are, thus, entitled to restitution and disgorgement in the amount Defendant was unjustly enriched, in an amount to be determined at trial.

COUNT 5

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

83. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all previously alleged paragraphs, except those allegations made under the preceding Counts, as if fully alleged herein.

84. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the Multistate Class (for purposes of this Count, the “Class”).

85. A dispute between Plaintiffs and the Class and Defendant is before this Court concerning the construction of the auto insurance policies issued by Defendant, and the rights of Plaintiffs and the Class arising under that policy.

86. Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the Class, seek a declaration of rights and liabilities of the parties herein. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that in paying total-loss claims by first-party insureds, it is a breach of Defendant’s insurance contract, as well as a violation of law, for Defendant to base the valuation and payment of claims on values of comparable vehicles that have been reduced by arbitrary typical negotiation adjustments that are (a) arbitrary, (b) contrary to industry practices and consumer experiences (and therefore not reflective of the vehicle’s fair market value), and (c) not as reasonably specific or appropriate as to dollar amount.

87. Defendant’s unlawful common policy and general business practice as described herein are ongoing. Accordingly, Defendant has breached, and continues to breach, the express terms of its contracts of insurance with Plaintiffs and members of the Class.

88. As a result of these breaches of contract, Plaintiffs and the Class members have been injured.

II. CAUSES OF ACTION ASSERTED ON BEHALF OF THE STATE SUBCLASSES

A. Illinois

COUNT 6

VIOLATION OF THE ILLINOIS CONSUMER FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ACT 815 ILCS, 505/1, *et seq.*

89. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all previously alleged paragraphs, except those allegations made under the preceding Counts, as if fully alleged herein.

90. This Count is brought by Plaintiff Maria Munoz (for purposes of this Count, “Plaintiff”) individually and on behalf of the Illinois Subclass (for purposes of this Count, the “Class”).

91. Defendant, Plaintiff, and the Class members are “persons” within the meaning of 815 ILCS 505/1(c).

92. Plaintiff and the Class members are “consumers” within the meaning of 815 ILCS 505/1(e).

93. Defendant was and is engaged in “trade” or “commerce” within the meaning of 815 ILCS 505/1(f).

94. The Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“Illinois CFA”) prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact . . . in the conduct of trade or commerce . . . whether any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby.” 815 ILCS 505/2.

95. As alleged herein, Defendant, through its agents, employees, and/or subsidiaries, violated the Illinois CFA by knowingly and intentionally concealing and failing to disclose

material facts regarding its application of an arbitrary “typical negotiation” adjustment to comparable vehicles in order to reduce their market value and, as a result, the amount of Defendant’s ACV payment to insureds, as detailed above.

96. Defendant also failed to comply with Illinois law, which requires insurance companies who use an “electronically computerized service” to determine the retail “market value” of a totaled vehicle to “include at last 2 currently available vehicles from licensed dealers in Illinois or 2 vehicles that have been sold by licensed dealers in Illinois...” Illinois Administrative Code Section 919.80(c)(2).

97. By knowingly and intentionally misrepresenting, omitting, concealing, and failing to disclose material facts regarding its application of an arbitrary “typical negotiation adjustment” to comparable vehicles, and its failure to comply with Illinois law, as detailed above, Defendant engaged in one or more unfair or deceptive business practices prohibited by the Illinois CFA.

98. Defendant’s misrepresentations and omissions regarding their application of an arbitrary “typical negotiation adjustment” to comparable vehicles were made to Plaintiff and the Class members in a uniform manner.

99. Defendant’s unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including its misrepresentations, concealments, omissions, and suppression of material facts, as alleged herein, had a tendency or capacity to mislead and create a false impression in consumers’ minds, and were likely to and, in fact, did deceive reasonable consumers, including Plaintiff and the Class members, about Defendant’s application of an arbitrary “typical negotiation adjustment” to comparable vehicles in order to reduce the amount of Defendant’s total-loss payments to its insureds.

100. The facts regarding Defendant’s application of an arbitrary “typical negotiation adjustment” to comparable vehicles that Defendant knowingly and intentionally misrepresented,

omitted, concealed, and/or failed to disclose would be considered material by a reasonable consumer, and they were, in fact, material to Plaintiff and the Class members, who consider such facts to be important to their purchase decisions with respect to Defendant's insurance coverage.

101. Plaintiff and Class members had no way of discerning that Defendant's representations were false and misleading, or otherwise learning the facts that Defendant had concealed or failed to disclose. Plaintiff and Class members did not, and could not, unravel Defendant's deception on their own.

102. Defendant had an ongoing duty to Plaintiff and the Class members to refrain from engaging in unfair or deceptive practices under the Illinois CFA in the course of its business. Specifically, Defendant owed Plaintiff and Class members a duty to disclose all the material facts concerning its application of an arbitrary "typical negotiation adjustment" to comparable vehicles because Defendant possessed exclusive knowledge of those facts, it intentionally concealed those facts from Plaintiff and the Class members, and/or it made misrepresentations that were rendered misleading because they were contradicted by withheld facts.

103. Plaintiff and the Class members were aggrieved by Defendant's violations of the Illinois CFA because they suffered ascertainable loss and actual damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's knowing and intentional misrepresentations, omissions, concealments, and failures to disclose material facts regarding its application of an arbitrary "typical negotiation adjustment" to comparable vehicles, including that the "typical negotiation adjustment" is arbitrarily selected and applied, in an inconsistent manner designed to decrease Defendant's total-loss payments under the Policy.

104. Plaintiff and the Class members purchased Defendant's insurance coverage in reliance on Defendant's misrepresentations, omissions, concealments, and/or failures to disclose

material facts regarding its promise to pay ACV in the event of a total loss and Defendant's application of an arbitrary "typical negotiation adjustment" to comparable vehicles to artificially reduce its total-loss payment to insureds.

105. Had Defendant not engaged in the deceptive acts and practices alleged herein, Plaintiff and Class members would not have purchased insurance coverage from Defendant or would not paid as much for it and, thus, they did not receive the benefit of the bargain and/or they suffered out-of-pocket loss.

106. Defendant's violations of the Illinois CFA present a continuing risk of future harm to Plaintiff and the Class members.

107. Plaintiff and the Class members seek an order enjoining Defendant's unfair and deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Illinois CFA and awarding actual damages, costs, attorneys' fees, and any other just and proper relief available under the Illinois CFA.

COUNT 7

BREACH OF CONTRACT

108. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all previously alleged paragraphs, except those allegations made under the preceding Counts, as if fully alleged herein.

109. This Count is brought by Plaintiff Maria Munoz (for purposes of this Count, "Plaintiff") individually and on behalf of the Illinois Subclass (for purposes of this Count, the "Class").

110. Plaintiff and each of the other Class members were insured under a policy issued by Defendant, as described herein.

111. Plaintiff and each of the other Class members made claims under their insurance contracts, which Defendant determined to be first-party total losses under the insurance contract, and additionally determined to be covered claims.

112. Pursuant to the above-described contractual provisions, upon the total loss of their insured vehicles, Defendant purported to pay Plaintiff and each of the other Class members the ACV of their totaled vehicles.

113. Defendant, however, failed to pay the ACV of Plaintiff's and Class members' vehicles because Defendant applied an arbitrary and capricious "typical negotiation" adjustment—and, in some cases, ordered the adjustments solely based on disadvantaging insureds and advantaging Defendant—to comparable vehicles in order to reduce their market value and, as a result, Defendant's total-loss payments to insureds.

114. Defendant also failed to comply with Illinois law, which requires insurance companies who use an "electronically computerized service" to determine the retail "market value" of a totaled vehicle to "include at last 2 currently available vehicles from licensed dealers in Illinois or 2 vehicles that have been sold by licensed dealers in Illinois..." Illinois Administrative Code Section 919.80(c)(2).

115. Thus, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and each of the other Class members the promised ACV of their total-loss vehicles and thereby breached its contract with Plaintiff and each of the other Class members.

116. As a result of such contractual breaches, Plaintiff and each of the other Class members have been damaged and are entitled to recover damages, as well as costs, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, injunctive relief, and other relief as appropriate.

COUNT 8

BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

117. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all previously alleged paragraphs, except those allegations made under the preceding Counts, as if fully alleged herein.

118. This Count is brought by Plaintiff Maria Munoz (for purposes of this Count, “Plaintiff”) individually and on behalf of the Illinois Subclass (for purposes of this Count, the “Class”).

119. Every contract, including the Policy, contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The purpose of this duty is to ensure that parties do not take advantage of each other in a way that could not have been contemplated at the time the contract was drafted or do anything that will destroy the other party’s right to receive the benefit of the contract.

120. Disputes involving the exercise of good faith arise when one party is given broad discretion in performing its obligations under the contract. Where a contract specifically vests one of the parties with broad discretion in performing a term of the contract, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that the discretion be exercised reasonably and with proper motive, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties.

121. Under the Policy, Defendant had discretion to perform its obligations under the contract, including the obligation to determine the ACV of an insured’s total-loss vehicle. Defendant, however exercised its discretion unreasonably, with an improper motive, and in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties, specifically, to arbitrarily reduce the amount of its total-loss payments to insureds, as alleged herein.

122. Defendant also failed to comply with Illinois law, which requires insurance companies who use an “electronically computerized service” to determine the retail “market value” of a totaled vehicle to “include at last 2 currently available vehicles from licensed dealers in Illinois or 2 vehicles that have been sold by licensed dealers in Illinois...” Illinois Administrative Code Section 919.80(c)(2).

123. As such, Defendant breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by, *inter alia*:

- a. Intentionally applying “typical negotiation adjustments” to undervalue comparable vehicles, and, in turn, insureds’ total-loss vehicles;
- b. Failing to pay insureds the ACV of their total-loss vehicles;
- c. Interpreting the terms and conditions of its insurance policies in an unreasonable manner solely in an effort to understate the value of total-loss vehicles and avoid paying insureds the ACV on their total-loss claims;
- d. Inventing spurious grounds for undervaluing total-loss claims that are hidden, not specific in dollar amount, not adequately explained, and unreasonable

124. Defendant’s breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing have caused damages to Plaintiff and the Class. Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ damages include the amounts improperly deducted by Defendant from its payments to insureds on the basis of a typical negotiation adjustment.

COUNT 9

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

125. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all previously alleged paragraphs, except those allegations made under the preceding Counts, as if fully alleged herein.

126. This Count is brought by Plaintiff Maria Munoz (for purposes of this Count, “Plaintiff”) individually and on behalf of the Illinois Subclass (for purposes of this Count, the “Class”).

127. Plaintiff pleads this claim separately as well as in the alternative to their other claims, as without such claims they would have no adequate legal remedy.

128. Defendant requested and received a monetary benefit at the expense of Plaintiff and Class members in the form of premium payments for automobile insurance coverage.

129. Defendant misrepresented, omitted, concealed, and/or failed to disclose material facts regarding its promise to pay ACV in the event of a total loss, specifically Defendant’s application of an arbitrary “typical negotiation adjustment” to comparable vehicles to artificially reduce their ACV payment to insureds.

130. Defendant also failed to comply with Illinois law, which requires insurance companies who use an “electronically computerized service” to determine the retail “market value” of a totaled vehicle to “include at last 2 currently available vehicles from licensed dealers in Illinois or 2 vehicles that have been sold by licensed dealers in Illinois...” Illinois Administrative Code Section 919.80(c)(2).

131. If Defendant had not misrepresented, omitted, concealed, and/or failed to disclose material facts regarding its promise to pay ACV in the event of a total loss, specifically Defendant’s application of an arbitrary “typical negotiation adjustment” to comparable vehicles to artificially reduce its total-loss payments to insureds and its failure to comply with Illinois law, Plaintiff and the Class members either would not have purchased insurance through Defendant, or they would have paid less for such insurance coverage.

132. Accordingly, Defendant was unjustly enriched by the premiums paid by Plaintiff and the Class members to the detriment of Plaintiff and the Class members.

133. Plaintiff and the Class members are, thus, entitled to restitution and disgorgement in the amount Defendant was unjustly enriched, in an amount to be determined at trial.

COUNT 10

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

134. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all previously alleged paragraphs, except those allegations made under the preceding Counts, as if fully alleged herein.

135. This Count is brought by Plaintiff Maria Munoz (for purposes of this Count, “Plaintiff”) individually and on behalf of the Illinois Subclass (for purposes of this Count, the “Class”).

136. A dispute between Plaintiff and the Class and Defendant is before this Court concerning the construction of the auto insurance policies issued by Defendant, and the rights of Plaintiff and the Class arising under that policy.

137. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the Class, seek a declaration of rights and liabilities of the parties herein. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that in paying total-loss claims by first-party insureds, it is a breach of Defendant’s insurance contract, as well as a violation of law, for Defendant to base the valuation and payment of claims on values of comparable vehicles that have been reduced by arbitrary typical negotiation adjustments that are (a) arbitrary, (b) contrary to industry practices and consumer experiences (and therefore not reflective of the vehicle’s fair market value), and (c) not as reasonably specific or appropriate as to dollar amount.

138. Defendant's unlawful common policy and general business practice as described herein are ongoing. Accordingly, Defendant has breached, and continues to breach, the express terms of their contracts of insurance with Plaintiff and members of the Class.

139. As a result of these breaches of contract, Plaintiff and the Class members have been injured.

B. North Carolina

COUNT 11

**NORTH CAROLINA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT,
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-1.1, *et seq.***

140. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all previously alleged paragraphs, except those allegations made under the preceding Counts, as if fully alleged herein.

141. This claim is brought by Plaintiff Sandra Smiling (for purposes of this Count, "Plaintiff") individually and on behalf of the North Carolina Subclass (for purposes of this Count, the "Class").

142. Defendant advertised, offered, or sold goods services in North Carolina and engaged in trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of North Carolina, as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 75-1.1(b).

143. The North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act ("NCUTPA"), N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-1.1, *et seq.*, prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.

144. As alleged herein, Defendant, through its agents, employees, and/or subsidiaries, violated the NCUTPA by knowingly and intentionally concealing and failing to disclose material facts regarding its application of an arbitrary "typical negotiation adjustment" to comparable

vehicles in order to reduce their market value and, as a result, the amount of Defendant's total-loss payments to insureds, as detailed above.

145. Defendant also violated North Carolina law, which requires total loss settlement offers to be based upon the following values: "(1) The published regional average values of substantially similar motor vehicles; and (2) The retail cost of two or more substantially similar motor vehicles in the local market area when substantially similar motor vehicles are available or were available within 90 days of the accident to consumers in the local market area [or] If no substantially similar motor vehicle is able to be located in the local market area, the settlement offer may be based upon quotations obtained from two or more licensed motor vehicle dealers located within the local market area." North Carolina 11 NCAC 04 .0418.

146. By knowingly and intentionally misrepresenting, omitting, concealing, and failing to disclose material facts regarding its application of an arbitrary "typical negotiation adjustment" to comparable vehicles and failure to comply with North Carolina law, as detailed above, Defendant engaged in one or more unfair or deceptive business practices prohibited by the NCUTPA.

147. Defendant's misrepresentations and omissions regarding its application of an arbitrary "typical negotiation adjustment" to comparable vehicles were made to Plaintiff and the Class members in a uniform manner.

148. Defendant's unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including its misrepresentations, concealments, omissions, and suppression of material facts, as alleged herein, had a tendency or capacity to mislead and create a false impression in consumers' minds, and were likely to and, in fact, did deceive reasonable consumers, including Plaintiff and the Class members, about

Defendant's application of an arbitrary "typical negotiation adjustment" to comparable vehicles in order to reduce the amount of Defendant's total-loss payments to its insureds.

149. The facts regarding Defendant's application of an arbitrary "typical negotiation adjustment" to comparable vehicles that Defendant knowingly and intentionally misrepresented, omitted, concealed, and/or failed to disclose would be considered material by a reasonable consumer, and they were, in fact, material to Plaintiff and the Class members, who consider such facts to be important to their purchase decisions with respect to Defendant's insurance coverage.

150. Plaintiff and Class members had no way of discerning that Defendant's representations were false and misleading, or otherwise learning the facts that Defendant had concealed or failed to disclose. Plaintiff and Class members did not, and could not, unravel Defendant's deception on their own.

151. Defendant had an ongoing duty to Plaintiff and the Class members to refrain from engaging in unfair or deceptive practices under the NCUTPA in the course of its business. Specifically, Defendant owed Plaintiff and Class members a duty to disclose all the material facts concerning their application of an arbitrary "typical negotiation adjustment" to comparable vehicles because Defendant possessed exclusive knowledge of those facts, it intentionally concealed those facts from Plaintiff and the Class members, and/or it made misrepresentations that were rendered misleading because they were contradicted by withheld facts.

152. Plaintiff and the Class members were aggrieved by Defendant's violations of the NCUTPA because they suffered ascertainable loss and actual damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's knowing and intentional misrepresentations, omissions, concealments, and failures to disclose material facts regarding their application of an arbitrary "typical negotiation adjustment" to comparable vehicles, including that the "typical negotiation adjustment" is

arbitrarily selected and applied, in an inconsistent manner designed to decrease Defendant's ACV payments under the Policy.

153. Plaintiff and the Class members purchased Defendant's insurance coverage in reliance on Defendant's misrepresentations, omissions, concealments, and/or failures to disclose material facts regarding its promise to pay ACV in the event of a total loss and Defendant's application of an arbitrary "typical negotiation adjustment" to comparable vehicles to artificially reduce its total-loss payment to insureds.

154. Had Defendant not engaged in the deceptive acts and practices alleged herein, Plaintiff and Class members would not have purchased insurance coverage from Defendant or they would have paid less and, thus, they did not receive the benefit of the bargain and/or they suffered out-of-pocket loss.

155. Defendant's violations of the NCUTPA present a continuing risk of future harm to Plaintiff and the Class members.

156. Plaintiff and the Class members seek an order enjoining Defendant's unfair and deceptive acts or practices in violation of the NCUTPA and awarding actual damages, costs, attorneys' fees, and any other just and proper relief available under the NCUTPA.

COUNT 12

BREACH OF CONTRACT

157. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all previously alleged paragraphs, except those allegations made under the preceding Counts, as if fully alleged herein.

158. This claim is brought by Plaintiff Sandra Smiling (for purposes of this Count, "Plaintiff") individually and on behalf of the North Carolina Subclass (for purposes of this Count, the "Class").

159. Plaintiff and each of the other Class members were insured under a policy issued by Defendant, as described herein.

160. Plaintiff and each of the other Class members made claims under their insurance contracts, which Defendant determined to be first-party total losses under the insurance contract, and additionally determined to be covered claims.

161. Pursuant to the above-described contractual provisions, upon the total loss of their insured vehicles, Defendant purported to pay Plaintiff and each of the other Class members the ACV of their totaled vehicles.

162. Defendant, however, failed to pay the ACV of Plaintiff's and Class members' vehicles because Defendant applied an arbitrary and capricious "typical negotiation adjustment" to comparable vehicles in order to reduce their market value and, as a result, Defendant's total-loss payments to insureds.

163. Defendant also violated North Carolina law, which requires total loss settlement offers to be based upon the following values: "(1) The published regional average values of substantially similar motor vehicles; and (2) The retail cost of two or more substantially similar motor vehicles in the local market area when substantially similar motor vehicles are available or were available within 90 days of the accident to consumers in the local market area [or] If no substantially similar motor vehicle is able to be located in the local market area, the settlement offer may be based upon quotations obtained from two or more licensed motor vehicle dealers located within the local market area." North Carolina 11 NCAC 04 .0418.

164. Thus, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and each of the other Class members the promised ACV of their total-loss vehicles and thereby breached its contract with Plaintiff and each of the other Class members.

165. As a result of such contractual breaches, Plaintiff and each of the other Class members have been damaged and are entitled to recover damages, as well as costs, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, injunctive relief, and other relief as appropriate.

COUNT 13

BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

166. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all previously alleged paragraphs, except those allegations made under the preceding Counts, as if fully alleged herein.

167. This claim is brought by Plaintiff Sandra Smiling (for purposes of this Count, “Plaintiff”) individually and on behalf of the North Carolina Subclass (for purposes of this Count, the “Class”).

168. Every contract, including the Policy, contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The purpose of this duty is to ensure that parties do not take advantage of each other in a way that could not have been contemplated at the time the contract was drafted or do anything that will destroy the other party’s right to receive the benefit of the contract.

169. Disputes involving the exercise of good faith arise when one party is given broad discretion in performing its obligations under the contract. Where a contract specifically vests one of the parties with broad discretion in performing a term of the contract, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that the discretion be exercised reasonably and with proper motive, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties.

170. Under the Policy, Defendant had discretion to perform its obligations under the contract, including the obligation to determine the ACV of an insured’s total-loss vehicle. Defendant, however exercised its discretion unreasonably, with an improper motive, and in a manner that was arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the

parties, specifically, to arbitrarily reduce the amount of its total-loss payments to insureds, as alleged herein.

171. Defendant also violated North Carolina law, which requires total loss settlement offers to be based upon the following values: “(1) The published regional average values of substantially similar motor vehicles; and (2) The retail cost of two or more substantially similar motor vehicles in the local market area when substantially similar motor vehicles are available or were available within 90 days of the accident to consumers in the local market area [or] If no substantially similar motor vehicle is able to be located in the local market area, the settlement offer may be based upon quotations obtained from two or more licensed motor vehicle dealers located within the local market area.” North Carolina 11 NCAC 04 .0418.

172. As such, Defendant breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by, *inter alia*:

- a. Intentionally applying “typical negotiation adjustments” to undervalue comparable vehicles, and, in turn, insureds’ total-loss vehicles;
- b. Failing to pay insureds the ACV of their total-loss vehicles;
- c. Interpreting the terms and conditions of its insurance policies in an unreasonable manner solely in an effort to understate the value of total-loss vehicles and avoid paying insureds the ACV on their total-loss claims;
- d. Inventing spurious grounds for undervaluing total-loss claims that are hidden, not specific in dollar amount, not adequately explained, and unreasonable

173. Defendant’s breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing have caused damages to Plaintiff and the Class. Plaintiff’s and the Class member’s damages include the

amounts improperly deducted by Defendant from its payments to insureds on the basis of a typical negotiation adjustment.

COUNT 14

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

174. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all previously alleged paragraphs, except those allegations made under the preceding Counts, as if fully alleged herein.

175. This claim is brought by Plaintiff Sandra Smiling (for purposes of this Count, “Plaintiff”) individually and on behalf of the North Carolina Subclass (for purposes of this Count, the “Class”).

176. Plaintiff pleads this claim separately as well as in the alternative to her other claims, as without such claims she would have no adequate legal remedy.

177. Defendant requested and received a monetary benefit at the expense of Plaintiff and Class members in the form of premium payments for automobile insurance coverage.

178. Defendant misrepresented, omitted, concealed, and/or failed to disclose material facts regarding its promise to pay ACV in the event of a total loss, specifically Defendant’s application of an arbitrary “typical negotiation adjustment” to comparable vehicles to artificially reduce its total-loss payments to insureds.

179. Defendant also violated North Carolina law, which requires total loss settlement offers to be based upon the following values: “(1) The published regional average values of substantially similar motor vehicles; and (2) The retail cost of two or more substantially similar motor vehicles in the local market area when substantially similar motor vehicles are available or were available within 90 days of the accident to consumers in the local market area [or] If no substantially similar motor vehicle is able to be located in the local market area, the settlement

offer may be based upon quotations obtained from two or more licensed motor vehicle dealers located within the local market area.” North Carolina 11 NCAC 04 .0418.

180. If Defendant had not misrepresented, omitted, concealed, and/or failed to disclose material facts regarding its promise to pay ACV in the event of a total loss, specifically Defendant’s application of an arbitrary “typical negotiation adjustment” to comparable vehicles to artificially reduce its total-loss payments to insureds, Plaintiff and the Class members either would not have purchased insurance through Defendant, or they would have paid less for such insurance coverage.

181. Accordingly, Defendant was unjustly enriched by the premiums paid by Plaintiff and the Class members to the detriment of Plaintiff and the Class members.

182. Plaintiff and the Class members are, thus, entitled to restitution and disgorgement in the amount Defendant was unjustly enriched, in an amount to be determined at trial.

COUNT 15

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

183. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege all previously alleged paragraphs, except those allegations made under the preceding Counts, as if fully alleged herein.

184. This claim is brought by Plaintiff Sandra Smiling (for purposes of this Count, “Plaintiff”) individually and on behalf of the North Carolina Subclass (for purposes of this Count, the “Class”).

185. A dispute between Plaintiff and the Class and Defendant is before this Court concerning the construction of the auto insurance policies issued by Defendant, and the rights of Plaintiff and the Class arising under that policy.

186. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the Class, seek a declaration of rights and liabilities of the parties herein. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that in paying total loss claims by first-party insureds, it is a breach of Defendant's insurance contract, as well as a violation of law, for Defendant to base the valuation and payment of claims on values of comparable vehicles that have been reduced by arbitrary typical negotiation adjustments that are (a) arbitrary, (b) contrary to industry practices and consumer experiences (and therefore not reflective of the vehicle's fair market value), and (c) not as reasonably specific or appropriate as to dollar amount.

187. Defendant's unlawful common policy and general business practice as described herein are ongoing. Accordingly, Defendant has breached, and continues to breach, the express terms of its contracts of insurance with Plaintiff and members of the Class.

188. As a result of these breaches of contract, Plaintiff and the Class members have been injured.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, respectfully seek judgement in Plaintiffs' favor and in favor of the Class as follows:

- A. An Order certifying this action as a Class Action and appointing Plaintiffs as Class Representative and Plaintiffs' counsel as Class Counsel;
- B. An award of damages (including actual, compensatory, statutory, and punitive, as provided by law) and restitution to Plaintiffs and the Class in an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest, in accordance with law;
- C. Disgorgement of Defendant's profits;

- D. Appropriate preliminary and/or final injunctive or equitable relief against the conduct of Defendant's described herein;
- E. An award Plaintiffs' and the Class' costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees as provided by law; and
- F. An award such further and additional relief as is necessary to redress the harm caused by Defendant's unlawful conduct and as the Court may deem just and proper under the circumstances.

Dated: October 1, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

SHAMIS & GENTILE, P.A.

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