

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Timothy Kelly, *on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated,*

Plaintiff,

v.

R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company,

Defendant.

Case No.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiff Timothy Kelly (“Plaintiff”) brings this Class Action Complaint against R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company (“RRD” or “Defendant”), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“Class Members”), and alleges, upon personal knowledge as to his own actions and his counsels’ investigations, and upon information and belief as to all other matters, as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff brings this class action against Defendant for its failure to properly secure and safeguard personally identifiable information (“PII”), including names, addresses, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and driver’s license numbers.

2. RRD is an American Fortune 500 company that provides marketing and business communications, commercial printing, and related services. Its corporate headquarters are located in Chicago, Illinois, United States.¹

3. Despite RRD’s status as one of the largest commercial printers in the world, RRD failed to detect an unauthorized intrusion into its systems for approximately a month. From

¹ <https://fortune.com/company/r-r-donnelley-sons/fortune500/>

November 29, 2021 to December 23, 2021, an unknown actor had access to RRD's network, including segments that contained Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII (the "Data Breach").

4. On or about mid-January 2022, Defendant became aware certain corporate data was accessed and exfiltrated by a ransomware group. It was not until on or around August 5, 2022, that Defendant finally began notifying Class Members that their PII had been accessed by an unauthorized intruder.

5. As a result of Defendant's failures, Plaintiff and, upon information and belief, tens of thousands of other individuals ("Class Members") have had their most sensitive personal information stolen by malicious cybercriminals. The information that was compromised is one-stop shopping for identity thieves to wreak complete havoc on their victims' lives. Moreover, given the sensitivity and static nature of the information involved (such as names, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, etc.), Plaintiff and Class Members will be forced to live in fear and constantly monitor for misuse of the stolen data, forever.

6. Businesses that collect and store PII have statutory, regulatory, contractual, and common law duties to safeguard that information and ensure it remains private.

7. Plaintiff and those similarly situated relied upon Defendant to maintain the security and privacy of the PII they entrusted to it. Plaintiff and Class Members reasonably expected and understood that Defendant would comply with its obligations to keep the PII secure and safe from unauthorized access, and to delete PII that was not reasonably necessary to hold for a legitimate business purpose.

8. Defendant is responsible for allowing this data breach through its failure to implement and maintain reasonable network safeguards, its unreasonable data retention policies,

failure to adequately train employees, and its failure to comply with industry-standard data security practices.

9. Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class have suffered actual and imminent injuries as a direct result of the data breach. The actual and imminent injuries suffered by Plaintiff and the proposed Class as a direct result of the data breach include: (a) theft of their personal data; (b) costs associated with the detection and prevention of identity theft; (c) costs associated with time spent and the loss of productivity from taking time to address and attempt to monitor, ameliorate, mitigate and deal with the consequences of the data breach; (d) the anxiety, stress, nuisance, and annoyance of dealing with all issues resulting from the data breach; (e) actual fraudulent activity on financial accounts; (f) increased fraudulent robocalls and phishing email attempts; (g) the potential for future fraud and the increased risk of identity theft posed by their personal data being placed in the hands of the ill-intentioned hackers and/or criminals; (h) damages to and diminution in value of their personal data entrusted to Defendant; (i) the retention of the reasonable value of the PII entrusted to Defendant; and (j) the continued risk to their personal data which remains in the possession of Defendant and which is subject to further breaches so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the PII in its possession.

10. As a result of this delayed response, Plaintiff and Class Members had no idea their PII had been compromised, and that they were, and continue to be, at significant risk of identity theft and various other forms of personal, social, and financial harm. The risk will remain for their respective lifetimes.

11. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of all persons whose PII was compromised as a result of Defendant's failure to: (i) adequately protect the Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII; (ii) warn Plaintiff and Class Members of Defendant's inadequate information security practices;

and (iii) effectively secure hardware containing protected PII using reasonable and effective security procedures free of vulnerabilities and incidents. Defendant's conduct amounts to negligence and violates federal and state statutes.

12. Defendant disregarded the rights of Plaintiff and Class Members by intentionally, willfully, recklessly, and/or negligently failing to take and implement adequate and reasonable measures to ensure that Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII was safeguarded, failing to take available steps to prevent an unauthorized disclosure of data, and failing to follow applicable, required and appropriate protocols, policies and procedures regarding the encryption of data, even for internal use. As the result, Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII was compromised through disclosure to an unknown and unauthorized third party. Plaintiff and Class Members have a continuing interest in ensuring that their information is and remains safe, and they should be entitled to injunctive and other equitable relief.

PARTIES

13. Plaintiff Timothy Kelly is a citizen of Tennessee residing in Attoka, Tennessee.

14. Defendant R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware, and its United States headquarters and principal place of business is located at 35 W. Wacker, 36th Floor, Chicago, IL 60601.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

15. This Court has subject matter and diversity jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) because this is a class action wherein the amount of controversy exceeds the sum or value of \$5 million, exclusive of interest and costs, there are more than 100 members in the proposed class, and at least one Class Member is a citizen of a state different from Defendant to establish minimal diversity.

16. The Northern District of Illinois has personal jurisdiction over Defendant named in this action because Defendant and/or its parents or affiliates are headquartered in this District and Defendant conducts substantial business in Illinois and this District through its headquarters, offices, parents, and affiliates.

17. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) because Defendant and/or its parents or affiliates are headquartered in this District and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in this District.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Background

18. Plaintiff and Class Members directly or indirectly entrusted Defendant with sensitive and confidential information, including their PII, which includes information that is static, does not change, and can be used to commit myriad financial crimes.

19. Plaintiff and Class Members relied on the sophistication of Defendant's business to keep their PII confidential and securely maintained, to use this information for business purposes only, and to make only authorized disclosures of this information. Plaintiff and Class Members demand security to safeguard their PII.

20. Defendant's Privacy Policy ("Privacy Policy") recognizes that RRD had a duty to adopt reasonable measures to protect Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII from involuntary disclosure to third parties.

21. Defendant's Privacy Policy applies to any personal information provided to RRD and any personal information that RRD collects from other source." RRD's Privacy Policy also represents:

The security of your personal data is important to us. We follow generally accepted industry standards to protect the personal data submitted to us, both during transmission and once we receive it.

RRD uses reasonable measures to safeguard personally identifiable data, which measures are appropriate to the type of data maintained and follows applicable laws regarding safeguarding any such data under our control. In addition, in some areas of our Sites, RRD may use encryption technology to enhance data privacy and help prevent loss, misuse, or alteration of the data under RRD's control. RRD also employs industry-standard measures and processes for detecting and responding to inappropriate attempts to breach our systems.²

22. Regarding the deletion of personal information Defendant no longer needs, the Privacy Policy represents as follows:

Depending on the country in which you live, work or access our Site(s), your data may be retained for a reasonable time for use in future contact with you, or for future improvements to RRD services. In the event the data you provide to us is an application for employment, that application will be held in accordance with our HR records management policy.³

The Data Breach

23. On or about August 5, 2022, Defendant sent Plaintiff and Class Members a Notice of Data Breach.

24. Defendant also notified various state Attorneys General of the Data Breach and provided the Attorneys General with “sample” notices of the Data Breach. The Notice of Data Breach informed Plaintiff and Class Members (in substantially the same form) that:

On December 23, 2021, RRD identified a systems intrusion in its technical environment. The Company promptly implemented a series of containment measures to address this situation, including activating its incident response protocols, shutting down its servers and systems and commencing a forensic investigation. Based on observed tactics, RRD identified the Threat Actor as being affiliated with a foreign ransomware group. RRD also determined that the Threat Actor gained access through a phishing attack that targeted several employees on or about November 29, 2021. RRD notified and is working with appropriate law enforcement authorities. Following this incident, RRD has also enriched its monitoring and analysis capabilities to combat future cyber threats.

RRD initially did not believe that the Threat Actor had removed any data from its environment. However, in mid-January 2022, RRD became aware that certain of

² <https://www.rrd.com/privacy-policy>

³ *Id.*

its corporate data was accessed and exfiltrated by the Threat Actor. It evaluated the affected data with the assistance of a third-party data discovery provider and ultimately identified certain employee personal data among the documents exfiltrated. RRD also determined that the exfiltrated documents included certain data related to clients for whom RRD provides printing and mailing services. It has notified the affected clients accordingly. It expended significant effort to review each of the documents in order to identify potentially affected clients and individuals. Affected documents included names, addresses, social security numbers, and, in some cases, dates of birth, and/or driver's license numbers.

25. Defendant advised that the information potentially impacted in the Data Breach included names, addresses, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and driver's license numbers. Defendant admitted in the Notice of Data Breach, the reports to the Attorneys General, and the "sample" notices of the Data Breach, that the unauthorized actors accessed files that contained sensitive information about Plaintiff and Class Members.

26. And there is a potential that more information was accessed and exfiltrated during the approximate month that the attacker was able to access Defendant's system without detection.

27. RRD collects a wide range of PII and other sensitive data as part of its regular business. Upon information and belief, RRD maintains:

- a. Basic personal details, such as names, address contact details, dates of birth, age, gender and marital status;
- b. Unique identifiers such as National Insurance Number or pension scheme reference number;
- c. Demographic details, such as information about age, gender, race, marital status, lifestyle, and insurance requirements;
- d. Employment information such as role, employment status (such as full/part time, contract), salary information, employment benefits, and employment history;

- e. Health information such as information about your health status, medical records and medical assessment outcomes;
- f. Benefits information such as benefit elections, pension entitlement information, date of retirement and any relevant matters impacting your benefits such as voluntary contributions, pension sharing orders, tax protections or other adjustments;
- g. Financial details such as payment card and bank account details, details of credit history and bankruptcy status, salary, tax code, third-party deductions, bonus payments, benefits and entitlement data, national insurance contributions details;
- h. Claims details such as information about any claims concerning employer's insurance policy;
- i. Marketing preferences;
- j. Online information: e.g., information about visits to its websites;
- k. Events information such as information about interest in and attendance at our events, including provision of feedback forms;
- l. Social media information such as interactions (e.g., likes and posts); and
- m. Criminal records information such as the existence of or alleged criminal offences, or confirmation of clean criminal records.

28. Defendant claims that to prevent a similar occurrence in the future, it implemented measures designed to enhance the monitoring and analysis capabilities of its network. However, the details of the root cause of the Data Breach, the vulnerabilities exploited, and the remedial measures undertaken to ensure a breach does not occur again have not been shared with regulators or Plaintiff and Class Members, who retain a vested interest in ensuring that their information

remains protected. There is a strong potential that additional information could have been accessed or that further breaches could occur.

Defendant Acquires, Collects, and Stores Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII

29. Defendant acquired, collected, and stored the PII of Plaintiff's and Class Members.

30. By obtaining, collecting, and storing the PII of Plaintiff's and Class Members, Defendant assumed legal and equitable duties and knew or should have known that it was responsible for protecting the PII from disclosure.

31. Plaintiff and Class Members have taken reasonable steps to maintain the confidentiality of their PII and relied on Defendant to keep their PII confidential and securely maintained, to use this information for business purposes only, and to make only authorized disclosures of this information.

Securing PII and Preventing Breaches

32. Defendant could have prevented this Data Breach by properly securing and encrypting the systems containing Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII. Alternatively, Defendant could have destroyed the data, especially for individuals with whom it had not had a relationship for a period of time.

33. Defendant's negligence failing to safeguard Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII is exacerbated by the repeated warnings and alerts directed to companies like Defendant to protect and secure sensitive data they possess.

34. Despite the prevalence of public announcements of data breach and data security compromises, Defendant failed to take appropriate steps to protect Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII from being compromised.

35. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) defines identity theft as “a fraud committed or attempted using the identifying information of another person without authority.”⁴ The FTC describes “identifying information” as “any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific person,” including, among other things, “[n]ame, Social Security number, date of birth, official State or government issued driver’s license or identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number.”⁵

36. The ramifications of Defendant’s failure to keep secure Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII are long lasting and severe. Once PII is stolen, particularly Social Security numbers, fraudulent use of that information and damage to victims may continue for years.

Value of PII

37. The PII of individuals remains of high value to criminals, as evidenced by the prices they will pay through the dark web. Numerous sources cite dark web pricing for stolen identity credentials. For example, personal information can be sold at a price ranging from \$40 to \$200, and bank details have a price range of \$50 to \$200.⁶ Experian reports that a stolen credit or debit card number can sell for \$5 to \$110 on the dark web.⁷ Criminals can also purchase access to entire company data breaches from \$900 to \$4,500.⁸

⁴ 17 C.F.R. § 248.201 (2013).

⁵ *Id.*

⁶ *Your personal data is for sale on the dark web. Here’s how much it costs*, Digital Trends, Oct. 16, 2019, available at: <https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/personal-data-sold-on-the-dark-web-how-much-it-costs/> (last accessed July 10, 2022).

⁷ *Here’s How Much Your Personal Information Is Selling for on the Dark Web*, Experian, Dec. 6, 2017, available at: <https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/heres-how-much-your-personal-information-is-selling-for-on-the-dark-web/> (last accessed July 10, 2022).

⁸ *In the Dark*, VPNOverview, 2019, available at: <https://vpnoverview.com/privacy/anonymous-browsing/in-the-dark/> (last accessed July 11, 2022).

38. Social Security numbers, for example, are among the worst kind of personal information to have stolen because they may be put to a variety of fraudulent uses and are difficult for an individual to change. The Social Security Administration stresses that the loss of an individual's Social Security number, as is the case here, can lead to identity theft and extensive financial fraud:

A dishonest person who has your Social Security number can use it to get other personal information about you. Identity thieves can use your number and your good credit to apply for more credit in your name. Then, they use the credit cards and don't pay the bills, it damages your credit. You may not find out that someone is using your number until you're turned down for credit, or you begin to get calls from unknown creditors demanding payment for items you never bought. Someone illegally using your Social Security number and assuming your identity can cause a lot of problems.⁹

39. What is more, it is no easy task to change or cancel a stolen Social Security number. An individual cannot obtain a new Social Security number without significant paperwork and evidence of actual misuse. In other words, preventive action to defend against the possibility of misuse of a Social Security number is not permitted; an individual must show evidence of actual, ongoing fraud activity to obtain a new number.

40. Even then, a new Social Security number may not be effective. According to Julie Ferguson of the Identity Theft Resource Center, "The credit bureaus and banks are able to link the new number very quickly to the old number, so all of that old bad information is quickly inherited into the new Social Security number."¹⁰

41. Based on the foregoing, the information compromised in the Data Breach is significantly more valuable than the loss of, for example, credit card information in a retailer data

⁹ Social Security Administration, *Identity Theft and Your Social Security Number*, available at: <https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10064.pdf> (last accessed July 10, 2022).

¹⁰ Bryan Naylor, *Victims of Social Security Number Theft Find It's Hard to Bounce Back*, NPR (Feb. 9, 2015), available at: <http://www.npr.org/2015/02/09/384875839/data-stolen-by-anthem-s-hackers-has-millionsworrying-about-identity-theft> (last accessed July 10, 2022).

breach because, there, victims can cancel or close credit and debit card accounts. The information compromised in this Data Breach is impossible to “close” and difficult, if not impossible, to change—Social Security number and name.

42. This data demands a much higher price on the black market. Martin Walter, senior director at cybersecurity firm RedSeal, explained, “Compared to credit card information, personally identifiable information and Social Security numbers are worth more than 10x on the black market.”¹¹

43. Among other forms of fraud, identity thieves may obtain driver’s licenses, government benefits, medical services, and housing or even give false information to police.

44. The fraudulent activity resulting from the Data Breach may not come to light for years. There is often a time lag between when harm occurs versus when it is discovered, and also between when PII is stolen and when it is used. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), which conducted a study regarding data breaches:

[L]aw enforcement officials told us that in some cases, stolen data may be held for up to a year or more before being used to commit identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information may continue for years. As a result, studies that attempt to measure the harm resulting from data breaches cannot necessarily rule out all future harm.¹²

45. At all relevant times, Defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, of the importance of safeguarding Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ PII, including Social Security numbers, and of the foreseeable consequences that would occur if Defendant’s data security

¹¹ Time Greene, *Anthem Hack: Personal Data Stolen Sells for 10x Price of Stolen Credit Card Numbers*, IT World, (Feb. 6, 2015), available at: <https://www.networkworld.com/article/2880366/anthem-hack-personal-data-stolen-sells-for-10x-price-of-stolen-credit-card-numbers.html> (last accessed July 10, 2022).

¹² *Report to Congressional Requesters*, GAO, at 29 (June 2007), available at: <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-07-737.pdf> (last accessed July 11, 2022).

system was breached, including, specifically, the significant costs that would be imposed on Plaintiff and Class Members as a result of a breach.

46. Plaintiff and Class Members now face years of constant surveillance of their financial and personal records, monitoring, and loss of rights. The Class is incurring and will continue to incur such damages in addition to any fraudulent use of their PII.

47. Defendant was, or should have been, fully aware of the unique type and the significant volume of data on Defendant's network, amounting to potentially millions of individuals' detailed, personal information and, thus, the significant number of individuals who would be harmed by the exposure of the unencrypted data.

48. To date, Defendant has offered Plaintiff and Class Members only twelve months of identity and credit monitoring services through Experian. The offered service is inadequate to protect Plaintiff and Class Members from the threats they face for years to come, particularly in light of the PII at issue here. Moreover, Defendant put the burden squarely on Plaintiff and Class Members to enroll in the inadequate monitoring services.

49. The injuries to Plaintiff and Class Members were directly and proximately caused by Defendant's failure to implement or maintain adequate data security measures for Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII.

50. As a condition of providing a wide range of risk-mitigation products, including insurance, pension administration, and health insurance plans, Defendant requires that its customers entrust it with PII.

51. By obtaining, collecting, using, and deriving a benefit from Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII, Defendant assumed legal and equitable duties and knew or should have known that it was responsible for protecting Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII from unauthorized disclosure.

52. Plaintiff and the Class Members have taken reasonable steps to maintain the confidentiality of their PII.

53. Plaintiff and the Class Members relied on Defendant to implement and follow adequate data security policies and protocols, to keep their PII confidential and securely maintained, to use such PII solely for business purposes, and to prevent the unauthorized disclosures of the PII.

Defendant failed to properly protect Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII

54. To prevent and detect unauthorized cyber-attacks, Defendant could and should have implemented, as recommended by the United States Government, the following measures:

- a. Implement an awareness and training program. Because end users are targets, employees and individuals should be aware of the threat of ransomware and how it is delivered.
- b. Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching the end users and authenticate inbound email using technologies like Sender Policy Framework (SPF), Domain Message Authentication Reporting and Conformance (DMARC), and DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) to prevent email spoofing.
- c. Scan all incoming and outgoing emails to detect threats and filter executable files from reaching end users.
- d. Configure firewalls to block access to known malicious IP addresses.
- e. Patch operating systems, software, and firmware on devices. Consider using a centralized patch management system.
- f. Set anti-virus and anti-malware programs to conduct regular scans automatically.

- g. Manage the use of privileged accounts based on the principle of least privilege: no users should be assigned administrative access unless absolutely needed; and those with a need for administrator accounts should only use them when necessary.
- h. Configure access controls—including file, directory, and network share permissions—with least privilege in mind. If a user only needs to read specific files, the user should not have write access to those files, directories, or shares.
- i. Disable macro scripts from office files transmitted via email. Consider using Office Viewer software to open Microsoft Office files transmitted via email instead of full office suite applications.
- j. Implement Software Restriction Policies (SRP) or other controls to prevent programs from executing from common ransomware locations, such as temporary folders supporting popular Internet browsers or compression/decompression programs, including the AppData/LocalAppData folder.
- k. Consider disabling Remote Desktop protocol (RDP) if it is not being used.
- l. Use application whitelisting, which only allows systems to execute programs known and permitted by security policy.
- m. Execute operating system environments or specific programs in a virtualized environment
- n. Categorize data based on organizational value and implement physical and logical separation of networks and data for different organizational units.¹³

¹³ *Id.* at 3-4.

55. To prevent and detect cyber-attacks, including the cyber-attack that resulted in the Data Breach, Defendant could and should have implemented, as recommended by the United States Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, the following measures:

- a. **Update and patch your computer.** Ensure your applications and operating systems (OSs) have been updated with the latest patches. Vulnerable applications and OSs are the target of most ransomware attacks....
- b. **Use caution with links and when entering website addresses.** Be careful when clicking directly on links in emails, even if the sender appears to be someone you know. Attempt to independently verify website addresses (e.g., contact your organization's helpdesk, search the internet for the sender organization's website or the topic mentioned in the email). Pay attention to the website addresses you click on, as well as those you enter yourself. Malicious website addresses often appear almost identical to legitimate sites, often using a slight variation in spelling or a different domain (e.g., .com instead of .net)...
- c. **Open email attachments with caution.** Be wary of opening email attachments, even from senders you think you know, particularly when attachments are compressed files or ZIP files.
- d. **Keep your personal information safe.** Check a website's security to ensure the information you submit is encrypted before you provide it....
- e. **Verify email senders.** If you are unsure whether or not an email is legitimate, try to verify the email's legitimacy by contacting the sender directly. Do not click on any links in the email. If possible, use a previous (legitimate) email to ensure the contact information you have for the sender is authentic before you contact them.

- f. **Inform yourself.** Keep yourself informed about recent cybersecurity threats and up to date on ransomware techniques. You can find information about known phishing attacks on the Anti-Phishing Working Group website. You may also want to sign up for CISA product notifications, which will alert you when a new Alert, Analysis Report, Bulletin, Current Activity, or Tip has been published.
- g. **Use and maintain preventative software programs.** Install antivirus software, firewalls, and email filters—and keep them updated—to reduce malicious network traffic....¹⁴

56. To prevent and detect cyber-attacks, including the cyber-attack that resulted in the Data Breach, Defendant could and should have implemented, as recommended by the Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team, the following measures:

Secure internet-facing assets

- Apply latest security updates
- Use threat and vulnerability management
- Perform regular audit; remove privileged credentials;

Thoroughly investigate and remediate alerts

- Prioritize and treat commodity malware infections as potential full compromise;

Include IT Pros in security discussions

- Ensure collaboration among [security operations], [security admins], and [information technology] admins to configure servers and other endpoints securely;

Build credential hygiene

- Use [multifactor authentication] or [network level authentication] and use strong, randomized, just-in-time local admin passwords

¹⁴ See Security Tip (ST19-001) Protecting Against Ransomware (original release date Apr. 11, 2019), available at <https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST19-001> (last accessed July 11, 2022).

Apply principle of least-privilege

- Monitor for adversarial activities
- Hunt for brute force attempts
- Monitor for cleanup of Event Logs
- Analyze logon events

Harden infrastructure

- Use Windows Defender Firewall
- Enable tamper protection
- Enable cloud-delivered protection
- Turn on attack surface reduction rules and [Antimalware Scan Interface] for Office [Visual Basic for Applications].¹⁵

57. Given that Defendant was storing Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII, Defendant could and should have implemented all of the above measures to prevent and detect cyberattacks.

58. The occurrence of the Data Breach indicates that Defendant failed to adequately implement one or more of the above measures to prevent cyberattacks, resulting in the Data Breach and the exposure of the Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII.

59. As the result of computer systems in need of security upgrades, inadequate procedures for handling email phishing attacks, viruses, malignant computer code, hacking attacks, Defendant negligently and unlawfully failed to safeguard Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII.

60. Defendant admitted that PII potentially impacted in the Data Breach contained Social Security numbers, driver's license information, and/or benefits enrollment information.

61. Because Defendant failed to properly protect safeguard Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII, an unauthorized third party was able to access Defendant's network, and access Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII stored on Defendant's system.

¹⁵ See Human-operated ransomware attacks: A preventable disaster (Mar 5, 2020), available at <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/> (last accessed Aug. 23, 2021).

Plaintiff's Experience

62. Plaintiff Timothy Kelly was employed by Defendant RRD for over thirty years.

63. Before the Data Breach, Defendant acquired and retained Plaintiff's name, address, Social Security numbers, date of birth, and driver's license numbers.

64. Plaintiff provided his PII to Defendant and trusted that Defendant would implement and maintain reasonable security measures to safeguard against the unauthorized disclosure of his PII.

65. In a letter dated August 5, 2022, Defendant notified Plaintiff that Defendant's network had been accessed and that the following information may have been impacted: Plaintiff's name, address, Social Security numbers, date of birth, and driver's license numbers.

66. Plaintiff is very careful about sharing his sensitive PII. Plaintiff has never knowingly transmitted unencrypted sensitive PII over the internet or any other unsecured source.

67. Plaintiff stores any documents containing his PII in a safe and secure location or destroys the documents. Moreover, Plaintiff diligently chooses unique usernames and passwords for his various online accounts.

68. As a result of the Data Breach notice, Plaintiff spent time dealing with the consequences of the Data Breach, which includes time spent verifying the legitimacy of the Notice of Data Breach, self-monitoring his accounts and credit reports to ensure no fraudulent activity has occurred. This time has been lost forever and cannot be recaptured.

69. Plaintiff suffered actual injury in the form of damages to and diminution in the value of Plaintiff's PII—a form of intangible property that Plaintiff entrusted to Defendant, which was compromised in and as a result of the Data Breach. Plaintiff suffered lost time, annoyance,

interference, and inconvenience as a result of the Data Breach and has anxiety and increased concerns for the loss of his privacy.

70. Plaintiff has suffered imminent and impending injury arising from the present and substantially increased risk of fraud, identity theft, and misuse resulting from his PII being placed in the hands of unauthorized third parties and possibly criminals.

71. Plaintiff has a continuing interest in ensuring that Plaintiff's PII, which, upon information and belief, remains backed up in Defendant's possession, is protected, and safeguarded from future breaches.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

72. Plaintiff brings this nationwide class action on behalf of himself and on behalf of others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), 23(b)(3), and 23(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

73. The Nationwide Class that Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as follows:

All persons Defendant identified as being among those individuals impacted by the Data Breach, including all who were sent a notice of the Data Breach.

74. Excluded from the Class are the following individuals and/or entities: Defendant and Defendant's parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, and any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest; all individuals who make a timely election to be excluded from this proceeding using the correct protocol for opting out; any and all federal, state or local governments, including but not limited to their departments, agencies, divisions, bureaus, boards, sections, groups, counsels and/or subdivisions; and all judges assigned to hear any aspect of this litigation, as well as their immediate family members.

75. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed classes before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate.

76. Numerosity, Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1): Class Members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are thousands of individuals whose PII may have been improperly accessed in the Data Breach, and each Class is apparently identifiable within Defendant's records.

77. Commonality, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and (b)(3): Questions of law and fact common to the Class exists and predominates over any questions affecting only individual Class Members. These include:

- a. Whether and to what extent Defendant had a duty to protect Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII;
- b. Whether Defendant had duties not to disclose the Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII to unauthorized third parties;
- c. Whether Defendant had duties not to use Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII for non-business purposes;
- d. Whether Defendant failed to adequately safeguard Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII;
- e. Whether and when Defendant actually learned of the Data Breach;
- f. Whether Defendant adequately, promptly, and accurately informed Plaintiff and Class Members that their PII had been compromised;
- g. Whether Defendant violated the law by failing to promptly notify Plaintiff and Class Members that their PII had been compromised;

- h. Whether Defendant failed to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and scope of the information compromised in the Data Breach;
- i. Whether Defendant adequately addressed and fixed the vulnerabilities which permitted the Data Breach to occur;
- j. Whether Defendant engaged in unfair, unlawful, or deceptive practices by failing to safeguard Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII;
- k. Whether Defendant violated the consumer protection statutes invoked herein;
- l. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to actual, consequential, and/or nominal damages as a result of Defendant's wrongful conduct;
- m. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendant's wrongful conduct; and
- n. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to injunctive relief to redress the imminent and currently ongoing harm faced as a result of the Data Breach.

78. Typicality, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3): Plaintiff's claims are typical of those of other Class Members because all had their PII compromised as a result of the Data Breach, due to Defendant's misfeasance.

79. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is also appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby requiring the Court's imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class Members and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendant's policies challenged herein apply to and affect Class Members

uniformly and Plaintiff's challenge of these policies hinges on Defendant's conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff.

80. Adequacy, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4): Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members in that Plaintiff has no disabling conflicts of interest that would be antagonistic to those of the other Members of the Class. Plaintiff seeks no relief that is antagonistic or adverse to the Members of the Class and the infringement of the rights and the damages Plaintiff has suffered are typical of other Class Members. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in complex class action litigation, and Plaintiff intend to prosecute this action vigorously.

81. Superiority and Manageability, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3): Class litigation is an appropriate method for fair and efficient adjudication of the claims involved. Class action treatment is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein; it will permit a large number of Class Members to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort, and expense that hundreds of individual actions would require. Class action treatment will permit the adjudication of relatively modest claims by certain Class Members, who could not individually afford to litigate a complex claim against large corporations, like Defendant. Further, even for those Class Members who could afford to litigate such a claim, it would still be economically impractical and impose a burden on the courts.

82. The nature of this action and the nature of laws available to Plaintiff and Class Members make the use of the class action device a particularly efficient and appropriate procedure to afford relief to Plaintiff and Class Members for the wrongs alleged because Defendant would necessarily gain an unconscionable advantage since they would be able to exploit and overwhelm

the limited resources of each individual Class Member with superior financial and legal resources; the costs of individual suits could unreasonably consume the amounts that would be recovered; proof of a common course of conduct to which Plaintiff were exposed is representative of that experienced by the Class and will establish the right of each Class Member to recover on the cause of action alleged; and individual actions would create a risk of inconsistent results and would be unnecessary and duplicative of this litigation.

83. The litigation of the claims brought herein is manageable. Defendant's uniform conduct, the consistent provisions of the relevant laws, and the ascertainable identities of Class Members demonstrates that there would be no significant manageability problems with prosecuting this lawsuit as a class action.

84. Adequate notice can be given to Class Members directly using information maintained in Defendant's records.

85. Unless a Class-wide injunction is issued, Defendant may continue in their failure to properly secure the PII of Class Members, Defendant may continue to refuse to provide proper notification to Class Members regarding the Data Breach, and Defendant may continue to act unlawfully as set forth in this Complaint.

86. Further, Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and, accordingly, final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief with regard to the Class Members as a whole is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

87. Likewise, particular issues under Rule 23(c)(4) are appropriate for certification because such claims present only particular, common issues, the resolution of which would

advance the disposition of this matter and the parties' interests therein. Such particular issues include, but are not limited to:

- a. Whether Defendant owed a legal duty to Plaintiff and Class Members to exercise due care in collecting, storing, using, and safeguarding their PII;
- b. Whether Defendant breached a legal duty to Plaintiff and Class Members to exercise due care in collecting, storing, using, and safeguarding their PII;
- c. Whether Defendant failed to comply with its own policies and applicable laws, regulations, and industry standards relating to data security;
- d. Whether an implied contract existed between Defendant on the one hand, and Plaintiff and Class Members on the other, and the terms of that implied contract;
- e. Whether Defendant breached the implied contract;
- f. Whether Defendant adequately and accurately informed Plaintiff and Class Members that their PII had been compromised;
- g. Whether Defendant failed to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and scope of the information compromised in the Data Breach;
- h. Whether Defendant engaged in unfair, unlawful, or deceptive practices by failing to safeguard Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII;
- i. Whether Class Members are entitled to actual, consequential, and/or nominal damages, and/or injunctive relief as a result of Defendant's wrongful conduct.

COUNT I
NEGLIGENCE
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

88. Plaintiff and the Class repeat and re-allege each and every allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

89. Plaintiff and the Class entrusted Defendant with their PII.

90. Plaintiff and the Class entrusted their PII to Defendant on the premise and with the understanding that Defendant would safeguard their information, use their PII for business purposes only, and/or not disclose their PII to unauthorized third parties.

91. Defendant has full knowledge of the sensitivity of the PII and the types of harm that Plaintiff and the Class could and would suffer if the PII were wrongfully disclosed.

92. Defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the failure to exercise due care in the collecting, storing, and using of the PII of Plaintiff and the Class involved an unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiff and the Class, even if the harm occurred through the criminal acts of a third party.

93. Defendant had a duty to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding, securing, and protecting such information from being compromised, lost, stolen, misused, and/or disclosed to unauthorized parties. This duty includes, among other things, designing, maintaining, and testing Defendant's security protocols to ensure that the PII of Plaintiff and the Classes in Defendant's possession was adequately secured and protected.

94. Defendant also had a duty to exercise appropriate clearinghouse practices to remove PII they were no longer required to retain pursuant to regulations.

95. Defendant also had a duty to have procedures in place to detect and prevent the improper access and misuse of the PII of Plaintiff and the Class.

96. Defendant's duty to use reasonable security measures arose as a result of the special relationship that existed between Defendant and Plaintiff and the Class. That special relationship arose because Plaintiff and the Class entrusted Defendant with their confidential PII, a necessary part of obtaining services from Defendant.

97. Defendant was subject to an "independent duty," untethered to any contract between Defendant and Plaintiff or the Class.

98. A breach of security, unauthorized access, and resulting injury to Plaintiff and the Class was reasonably foreseeable, particularly in light of Defendant's inadequate security practices.

99. Plaintiff and the Class were the foreseeable and probable victims of any inadequate security practices and procedures. Defendant knew or should have known of the inherent risks in collecting and storing the PII of Plaintiff and the Class, the critical importance of providing adequate security of that PII, and the necessity for encrypting PII stored on Defendant's systems.

100. Defendant's own conduct created a foreseeable risk of harm to Plaintiff and the Class. Defendant's misconduct included, but was not limited to, its failure to take the steps and opportunities to prevent the Data Breach as set forth herein. Defendant's misconduct also included its decisions not to comply with industry standards for the safekeeping of the PII of Plaintiff and the Class, including basic encryption techniques freely available to Defendant.

101. Plaintiff and the Class had no ability to protect their PII that was in, and possibly remains in, Defendant's possession.

102. Defendant was in a position to protect against the harm suffered by Plaintiff and the Class as a result of the Data Breach.

103. Defendant had and continue to have a duty to adequately disclose that the PII of Plaintiff and the Class within Defendant's possession might have been compromised, how it was compromised, and precisely the types of data that were compromised and when. Such notice was necessary to allow Plaintiff and the Class to take steps to prevent, mitigate, and repair any identity theft and the fraudulent use of their PII by third parties.

104. Defendant had a duty to employ proper procedures to prevent the unauthorized dissemination of the PII of Plaintiff and the Class.

105. Defendant has admitted that the PII of Plaintiff and the Class was wrongfully lost and disclosed to unauthorized third persons as a result of the Data Breach.

106. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duties to Plaintiff and the Class by failing to implement industry protocols and exercise reasonable care in protecting and safeguarding the PII of Plaintiff and the Class during the time the PII was within Defendant's possession or control.

107. Defendant improperly and inadequately safeguarded the PII of Plaintiff and the Class in deviation of standard industry rules, regulations, and practices at the time of the Data Breach.

108. Defendant failed to heed industry warnings and alerts to provide adequate safeguards to protect the PII of Plaintiff and the Class in the face of increased risk of theft.

109. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to Plaintiff and the Class by failing to have appropriate procedures in place to detect and prevent dissemination of PII.

110. Defendant breached its duty to exercise appropriate clearinghouse practices by failing to remove PII they were no longer required to retain pursuant to regulations.

111. Defendant, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to adequately and timely disclose to Plaintiff and the Class the existence and scope of the Data Breach.

112. But for Defendant's wrongful and negligent breach of duties owed to Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class, the PII of Plaintiff and the Class would not have been compromised.

113. There is a close causal connection between Defendant's failure to implement security measures to protect the PII of Plaintiff and the Class and the harm, or risk of imminent harm, suffered by Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class. The PII of Plaintiff and the Class was lost and accessed as the proximate result of Defendant's failure to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding such PII by adopting, implementing, and maintaining appropriate security measures.

114. Additionally, Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits "unfair . . . practices in or affecting commerce," including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair act or practice by businesses, such as Defendant, of failing to use reasonable measures to protect PII. The FTC publications and orders described above also form part of the basis of Defendant's duty in this regard.

115. Defendant violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by failing to use reasonable measures to protect PII and not complying with applicable industry standards, as described in detail herein. Defendant's conduct was particularly unreasonable given the nature and amount of PII it obtained and stored and the foreseeable consequences of the immense damages that would result to Plaintiff and the Class.

116. Defendant's violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act constitutes negligence per se.

117. Plaintiff and the Class are within the class of persons that the FTC Act was intended to protect.

118. The harm that occurred as a result of the Data Breach is the type of harm the FTC Act was intended to guard against. The FTC has pursued enforcement actions against businesses, which, as a result of their failure to employ reasonable data security measures and avoid unfair and deceptive practices, caused the same harm as that suffered by Plaintiff and the Class.

119. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence and negligence per se, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered and will suffer injury, including but not limited to: (i) actual identity theft; (ii) the loss of the opportunity of how their PII is used; (iii) the compromise, publication, and/or theft of their PII; (iv) out-of-pocket expenses associated with the prevention, detection, and recovery from identity theft, tax fraud, and/or unauthorized use of their PII; (v) lost opportunity costs associated with effort expended and the loss of productivity addressing and attempting to mitigate the present and continuing consequences of the Data Breach, including but not limited to efforts spent researching how to prevent, detect, contest, and recover from tax fraud and identity theft; (vi) costs associated with placing freezes on credit reports; (vii) the continued risk to their PII, which remain in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the PII of Plaintiff and the Class; and (viii) present and continuing costs in terms of time, effort, and money that has been and will be expended to prevent, detect, contest, and repair the impact of the PII compromised as a result of the Data Breach for the remainder of the lives of Plaintiff and the Class.

120. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence and negligence per se, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered and will continue to suffer other forms of injury and/or harm, including, but not limited to, anxiety, emotional distress, loss of privacy, and other economic and non-economic losses.

121. Additionally, as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence and negligence per se, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered and will suffer the continued risks of exposure of their PII, which remain in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect the PII in its continued possession.

122. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence and negligence per se, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to recover actual, consequential, and nominal damages.

COUNT II
Breach of Implied Contract
(On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

123. Plaintiff and the Class repeat and re-allege each and every allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

124. Plaintiff and the Class entrusted their PII to Defendant. In so doing, Plaintiff and the Class entered into implied contracts with Defendant by which Defendant agreed to safeguard and protect such information, to keep such information secure and confidential, and to timely and accurately notify Plaintiff and the Class if their data had been breached and compromised or stolen.

125. In its Privacy Policy, Defendant represented that they had a legal duty to protect Plaintiff's and Class Member's PII.

126. Plaintiff and the Class fully performed their obligations under the implied contracts with Defendant.

127. Defendant breached the implied contracts they made with Plaintiff and the Class by failing to safeguard and protect their personal information, by failing to delete the information of Plaintiff and the Class once the relationship ended, and by failing to provide timely and accurate notice to them that personal information was compromised as a result of the Data Breach.

128. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's above-described breach of implied contract, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered (and will continue to suffer) ongoing, imminent, and impending threat of identity theft crimes, fraud, and abuse, resulting in monetary loss and economic harm; actual identity theft crimes, fraud, and abuse, resulting in monetary loss and economic harm; loss of the confidentiality of the stolen confidential data; the illegal sale of the compromised data on the dark web; expenses and/or time spent on credit monitoring and identity theft insurance; time spent scrutinizing bank statements, credit card statements, and credit reports; expenses and/or time spent initiating fraud alerts, decreased credit scores and ratings; lost work time; and other economic and non-economic harm.

129. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's above-described breach of implied contract, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to recover actual, consequential, and nominal damages.

COUNT III
Unjust Enrichment
(On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

130. Plaintiff and the Class repeat and re-allege each and every allegation in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

131. Plaintiff and Class Members conferred a monetary benefit on Defendant, by providing Defendant with their valuable PII.

132. Defendant enriched itself by saving the costs they reasonably should have expended on data security measures to secure Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII.

133. Instead of providing a reasonable level of security that would have prevented the Data Breach, Defendant instead calculated to avoid its data security obligations at the expense of Plaintiff and Class Members by utilizing cheaper, ineffective security measures. Plaintiff and Class

Members, on the other hand, suffered as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's failure to provide the requisite security.

134. Under the principles of equity and good conscience, Defendant should not be permitted to retain the monetary value of the benefit belonging to Plaintiff and Class Members, because Defendant failed to implement appropriate data management and security measures that are mandated by industry standards.

135. Defendant acquired the monetary benefit and PII through inequitable means in that they failed to disclose the inadequate security practices previously alleged.

136. If Plaintiff and Class Members knew that Defendant had not secured their PII, they would not have agreed to provide their PII to Defendant.

137. Plaintiff and Class Members have no adequate remedy at law.

138. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered and will suffer injury, including but not limited to: (i) actual identity theft; (ii) the loss of the opportunity how their PII is used; (iii) the compromise, publication, and/or theft of their PII; (iv) out-of-pocket expenses associated with the prevention, detection, and recovery from identity theft, and/or unauthorized use of their PII; (v) lost opportunity costs associated with effort expended and the loss of productivity addressing and attempting to mitigate the actual and future consequences of the Data Breach, including but not limited to efforts spent researching how to prevent, detect, contest, and recover from identity theft; (vi) the continued risk to their PII, which remain in Defendant's possession and is subject to further unauthorized disclosures so long as Defendant fails to undertake appropriate and adequate measures to protect PII in their continued possession and (vii) future costs in terms of time, effort, and money that will be expended to

prevent, detect, contest, and repair the impact of the PII compromised as a result of the Data Breach for the remainder of the lives of Plaintiff and Class Members.

139. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's conduct, Plaintiff and Class Members have suffered and will continue to suffer other forms of injury and/or harm.

140. Defendant should be compelled to disgorge into a common fund or constructive trust, for the benefit of Plaintiff and Class Members, proceeds that they unjustly received from them.

COUNT IV
Invasion of Privacy
(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

141. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs in the Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

142. Plaintiff and Class Members had a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding their PII and were accordingly entitled to the protection of this information against disclosure to unauthorized third parties.

143. Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff and Class Member to keep their PII confidential.

144. The unauthorized disclosure and/or acquisition (i.e., theft) by a third party of Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII is highly offensive to a reasonable person.

145. Defendant's reckless and negligent failure to protect Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII constitutes an intentional interference with Plaintiff's and the Class Members' interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to their person or as to their private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

146. Defendant's failure to protect Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII acted with a knowing state of mind when it permitted the Data Breach because it knew its information security practices were inadequate.

147. Defendant knowingly did not notify Plaintiff and Class Members in a timely fashion about the Data Breach.

148. Because Defendant failed to properly safeguard Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII, Defendant had notice and knew that its inadequate cybersecurity practices would cause injury to Plaintiff and the Class.

149. As a proximate result of Defendant's acts and omissions, Plaintiff's and the Class Members' private and sensitive PII was stolen by a third party and is now available for disclosure and redisclosure without authorization, causing Plaintiff and the Class to suffer damages.

150. Defendant's wrongful conduct will continue to cause great and irreparable injury to Plaintiff and the Class since their PII are still maintained by Defendant with their inadequate cybersecurity system and policies.

151. Plaintiff and Class Members have no adequate remedy at law for the injuries relating to Defendant's continued possession of their sensitive and confidential records. A judgment for monetary damages will not end Defendant's inability to safeguard Plaintiff's and the Class's PII.

152. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and Class Members, seeks injunctive relief to enjoin Defendant from further intruding into the privacy and confidentiality of Plaintiff's and Class Members' PII.

153. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and Class Members, seeks compensatory damages for Defendant's invasion of privacy, which includes the value of the privacy interest invaded by

Defendant, the costs of future monitoring of their credit history for identity theft and fraud, plus prejudgment interest, and costs.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:

- a) For an Order certifying this action as a Class action and appointing Plaintiff as Class Representative and him counsel as Class Counsel;
- b) For equitable relief enjoining Defendant from engaging in the wrongful conduct complained of herein pertaining to the misuse and/or disclosure of Plaintiff's and Class Members' Sensitive Information, and from refusing to issue prompt, complete and accurate disclosures to Plaintiff and Class Members;
- c) For equitable relief compelling Defendant to utilize appropriate methods and policies with respect to consumer data collection, storage, and safety, and to disclose with specificity the type of Sensitive Information compromised during the Data Breach;
- d) For equitable relief requiring restitution and disgorgement of the revenues wrongfully retained as a result of Defendant's wrongful conduct;
- e) Ordering Defendant's to pay for not less than three years of credit monitoring services for Plaintiff and the Class;
- f) For an award of actual damages, compensatory damages, statutory damages, and statutory penalties, in an amount to be determined, as allowable by law;
- g) For an award of punitive damages, as allowable by law;
- h) For an award of attorneys' fees and costs, and any other expense, including expert witness fees;

- i) Pre- and post-judgment interest on any amounts awarded; and
- j) Such other and further relief as this court may deem just and proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff hereby demands that this matter be tried before a jury.

Date: August 15, 2022

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Gary M. Klinger

Gary M. Klinger

**MILBERG COLEMAN BRYSON PHILLIPS
GROSSMAN, PLLC**

221 West Monroe Street, Suite 2100

Chicago, IL 60606

866.252.0878

gklinger@milberg.com

Terence R. Coates (pro hac vice forthcoming)

Jonathan T. Deters (pro hac vice forthcoming)

MARKOVITS, STOCK & DEMARCO, LLC

119 E. Court Street, Suite 530

Cincinnati, OH 45202

Telephone: 513.651.3700

Facsimile: 513.665.0219

tcoates@msdlegal.com

Counsel for Plaintiff and Putative Class