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12 *Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class*

13 **IN THE DISTRICT COURT**
14 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

15 MADELEINE BRASCH, on behalf of
16 herself and all others similarly situated,

17 *Plaintiff,*

18 v.

19 MEYER CORPORATION, U.S.

20 *Defendant.*

Case No. 4:22-cv-03570

Class Action Complaint

21 Plaintiff Madeleine Brasch, through her attorneys, brings this Class Action Complaint against
22 the Defendant, Meyer Corporation, U.S. (“Meyer” or “Defendant”), alleging as follows:

23 **INTRODUCTION**

24 1. In October 2021, Meyer, a cookware manufacturing company employing thousands of
25 employees, lost control over at least 2,747 employees’ highly sensitive personal information in a
26 data breach (“Data Breach”), and then failed to notify its employees about the breach for nearly four
27 months while cybercriminals publicly claimed responsibility for the Data Breach and published
28 certain stolen data to prove what they had done.

2. Cybercriminals bypassed Meyer’s inadequate security systems using ransomware to
access employees’ personally identifiable information (“PII”), including their names, addresses,
dates of birth, gender and race information, Social Security numbers, driver’s license numbers, and

1 medical information—including, but not limited to—medical conditions, prior drug tests, and
2 COVID vaccination cards and statuses. The cybercriminals also accessed information regarding the
3 employees’ immigration statuses and their dependents’ PII.

4 3. On or around October 25, 2021, cybercriminals breached Meyer’s systems and
5 impacted its operations. It is unknown for how long the breach went undetected before Meyer
6 detected it, meaning Meyer had no effective means to prevent, detect, or stop the Data Breach from
7 happening before cybercriminals stole and misused employees’ PII. On or around December 1,
8 2021, Meyer’s investigation confirmed the unauthorized access to its employees’ PII. Instead of
9 alerting its employees immediately, as required under California law, Meyer hid the breach from
10 current and former employees until February 2022, even after cybercriminals posted a percentage of
11 the leaked data online.

12 4. On February 15, 2022, Meyer finally informed its current and former employees of the
13 Data Breach and offered them 24 months of free credit monitoring service, which fails to adequately
14 address the lifelong threat the Data Breach poses to impacted employees.

15 5. Meyer’s failures to adequately protect employee PII and timely notify employees about
16 the devastating Data Breach harms its current and former employees in violation of California law.

17 6. Plaintiff Brasch is a former Meyer employee and Data Breach victim. She brings this
18 action on behalf of herself and all others harmed by Meyer’s misconduct, seeking relief on a class
19 wide basis.

20 **PARTIES**

21 7. Plaintiff Madeleine Brasch is a natural person and citizen of California residing in
22 Hayward, California, where she intends to remain. Plaintiff Brasch is a former Meyer employee and
23 Data Breach victim, which Meyer confirmed to her when she called the data breach hotline at 888-
24 292-0076.

25 8. Defendant Meyer Corp. is a Delaware corporation registered to do business in
26 California, with its principal place of business at 525 Curtola Parkway, Vallejo, CA 94590.

27 **JURISDICTION & VENUE**

28 9. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)

1 because at least one member of the proposed Class is a citizen of a state different from that of
2 Meyer;¹ the amount in controversy exceeds \$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs; the proposed
3 Class consists of more than 100 class members, and none of the exceptions under the subsection
4 apply to this action.

5 10. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Meyer is registered to do
6 business in California and is subject to this Court’s general and specific jurisdiction given that it is
7 headquartered in California and that this cause of action arises out of events that took place in
8 California.

9 11. Venue is proper 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events or
10 omissions giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this district—namely, she suffered severe
11 mental and emotional distress at her place of residence located in Alameda County.

12 **BACKGROUND FACTS**

13 **a. Meyer**

14 12. Meyer describes itself as “The global innovator of the highest quality brands of
15 cookware and bakeware in the world[,]” with over 3,500 employees.² Meyer conducts its business
16 internationally and owns a significant portfolio of other kitchenware brands.³

17 13. Meyer does and has employed thousands of individuals, with the Data Breach
18 impacting over 2,700 current and former employees.

19 14. Meyer requires that its employees disclose their PII as part of their employment with
20 Meyer, including their names, income information, Social Security numbers, driver’s license
21 numbers, medical information, and financial account numbers.

22 15. As a large employer managing employees’ highly sensitive PII, Meyer understands its
23

24
25 ¹ See, e.g., *Reported Data Breach Incidents*, MONTANA DEPT. OF JUSTICE (accessed June 16, 2022),
26 <https://dojmt.gov/consumer/databreach> (reporting that four Montana residents were affected by
Meyer’s data breach).

27 ² See Meyer’s website, <https://meyerus.com/about/> (last visited Mar. 23, 2022).

28 ³ See Meyer’s website, <http://meyerus.com/brands/> (last visited Mar. 23, 2022).

1 duty to safeguard employee PII using reasonable means, informing employees that “The security of
2 [their] information is a top priority, and [Meyer is] committed to the protection of [the employees’]
3 information.”⁴

4 16. Despite recognizing its duty to do so Meyer has not implemented reasonable
5 cybersecurity safeguards or policies to protect current and former employee PII, or trained its
6 employees to prevent, detect, and stop data breaches of Meyer’s systems. As a result, Meyer leaves
7 vulnerabilities in its systems for cybercriminals to exploit and give access to employee PII.

8 17. Indeed, upon investigation of counsel, Meyer has previously been subject to other data
9 breaches. Meyer has therefore displayed a pattern of institutional failure to safeguard highly
10 sensitive employee information.

11 **b. Meyer Fails to Safeguard Employee PII**

12 18. Meyer requires its employees to disclose their PII as a condition of employment at
13 Meyer.

14 19. Meyer collects and maintains employee PII in its computer systems.

15 20. In collecting and maintaining the PII, Meyer implicitly agrees it will safeguard the data
16 using reasonable means according to its internal policies and state and federal law.

17 21. Despite its duties to safeguard employee PII, on October 25, 2021, cybercriminals
18 bypassed Meyer’s security systems undetected and accessed employee information.

19 22. On or around December 1, 2021, Meyer finally discovered that cybercriminals accessed
20 employee PII, saying that it “identified potential unauthorized access to employee information,”⁵
21 though Meyer has never disclosed the exact date it became aware of the Data Breach.

22 23. Despite the devastating nature of the breach, Meyer did not immediately inform its
23

24
25 ⁴ See Meyer’s sample breach notice provided to the office of California’s Attorney General,
26 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/MCorp%20U.S.%20Sample%20Letters.pdf> (last visited Mar. 23,
2022).

27 ⁵ See Meyer’s sample breach notice provided to the office of California’s Attorney General,
28 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/MCorp%20U.S.%20Sample%20Letters.pdf> (last visited Mar. 23,
2022).

1 employees about the breach or otherwise notify them according to California law. Instead, Meyer
2 initiated an internal investigation with its “cybersecurity experts.”⁶

3 24. On information and belief, a cybercriminal group known as the “Conti Ransomware
4 Group” publicly claimed responsibility for the Data Breach on or around November 7, 2021. The
5 Conti cybercriminals published at least 2% of the stolen data online.⁷

6 25. On February 15, 2022, Meyer finally notified its current and former employees of the
7 Data Breach (“Breach Notice”)—nearly four months after the Data Breach and three months after
8 Conti’s publication of the data.⁸

9 26. Despite “investigating” the Data Breach for several months, Meyer’s Breach Notice
10 revealed little about the breach and obfuscated its nature. Indeed, the Breach Notice misinforms
11 employees that Meyer has “no evidence that [their] specific information was actually accessed or
12 impacted.” That statement is untrue as Meyer had reason to know the Conti cybercriminals had, in
13 fact, stolen employee PII as evidenced by Conti’s publication of some of the data on the internet.

14 27. Meyer’s Breach Notice assures employees that “The security of [its] employees’
15 information is a top priority,” telling them that Meyer has “taken steps to further enhance [its]
16 security controls, and continue[s] to investigate and evaluate [the Data Breach] to prevent a similar
17 occurrence in the future”—steps that should have taken place *before* the Data Breach.

18 28. Meyer’s Breach Notice informs Data Breach victims they can sign up for 24 months of
19 free credit monitoring, which does not adequately address the lifelong harm that the Data Breach
20 poses to its victims.

21 29. Meyer’s Breach Notice does not explain how the hack happened, why it took so long
22 for Meyer to discover it, that cybercriminals have posted employee PII online, what exactly
23 cybercriminals stole, and why it took Meyer nearly 4 months to disclose the breach in a bare-bones
24

25 ⁶ *Id.*

26 ⁷ See [https://www.techradar.com/news/meyer-hit-by-ransomware-attack-thousands-of-employees-](https://www.techradar.com/news/meyer-hit-by-ransomware-attack-thousands-of-employees-affected)
27 [affected](https://www.techradar.com/news/meyer-hit-by-ransomware-attack-thousands-of-employees-affected) (last visited Mar. 23, 2022).

28 ⁸ A true and accurate copy of the Breach Notice is attached as **Exhibit A**.

1 notice.

2 30. On information and belief, Meyer failed to adequately train its employees on
3 reasonable cybersecurity protocols or implement reasonable security measures, causing it to lose
4 control over employee PII. Meyer's negligence is evidenced by its failure to prevent the Data Breach
5 and stop cybercriminals from accessing PII.

6 **c. Plaintiff's Experience**

7 31. Plaintiff Brasch is a former Meyer employee, having worked as a biologist in the
8 company's Hestan Smart Cooking division from March 2018 until April 2019.

9 32. As a condition of Meyer's employment, Meyer required Plaintiff Brasch to provide her
10 PII.

11 33. Plaintiff Brasch provided her PII to Meyer and trusted that the company would use
12 reasonable measures to protect it according to Meyer's internal policies, as well as state and federal
13 law.

14 34. Plaintiff Brasch called 888-292-0076—the toll-free phone number listed on Meyer's
15 data breach notice—and Meyer confirmed that her information was part of the breach.

16 35. In late 2021, an unknown third-party attempted to create a Sprint wireless account in
17 Plaintiff Brasch's name. Given the close proximity between the data breach and this attempted
18 identity theft, it is reasonable to infer that Plaintiff Brasch's PII has already been accessed by
19 criminals as a result of the data breach.

20 36. Plaintiff Brasch has and will spend considerable time and effort monitoring her
21 accounts to protect herself from identity theft. Plaintiff fears for her personal financial security and
22 uncertainty over what PII was exposed in the Data Breach. Plaintiff has and is experiencing feelings
23 of anxiety, sleep disruption, stress, fear, and frustration because of the Data Breach. This goes far
24 beyond allegations of mere worry or inconvenience; it is exactly the sort of injury and harm to a
25 Data Breach victim that the law contemplates and addresses.

26 **d. Plaintiff and the Proposed Class Face Significant Risk of Continued Identity Theft**

27 37. Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class have suffered injury from the misuse of
28 their PII that can be directly traced to Defendant.

1 38. As a result of Meyer’s failure to prevent the Data Breach, Plaintiff and the proposed
2 Class have suffered and will continue to suffer damages, including monetary losses, lost time,
3 anxiety, and emotional distress. They have suffered, or are at an increased risk of suffering:

- 4 a. The loss of the opportunity to control how their PII is used;
- 5 b. The diminution in value of their PII;
- 6 c. The compromise and continuing publication of their PII;
- 7 d. Out-of-pocket costs associated with the prevention, detection, recovery, and
8 remediation from identity theft or fraud;
- 9 e. Lost opportunity costs and lost wages associated with the time and effort expended
10 addressing and attempting to mitigate the actual and future consequences of the Data
11 Breach, including, but not limited to, efforts spent researching how to prevent, detect,
12 contest, and recover from identity theft and fraud;
- 13 f. Delay in receipt of tax refund monies;
- 14 g. Unauthorized use of stolen PII; and
- 15 h. The continued risk to their PII, which remains in the possession of defendant and is
16 subject to further breaches so long as defendant fails to undertake the appropriate
17 measures to protect the PII in their possession.

18 39. Stolen PII is one of the most valuable commodities on the criminal information black
19 market. According to Experian, a credit-monitoring service, stolen PII can be worth up to \$1,000.00
20 depending on the type of information obtained.

21 40. The value of Plaintiff and the proposed Class’s PII on the black market is considerable.
22 Stolen PII trades on the black market for years, and criminals frequently post stolen private
23 information openly and directly on various “dark web” internet websites, making the information
24 publicly available, for a substantial fee of course.

25 41. It can take victims years to stop identity or PII theft, giving criminals plenty of time to
26 use that information for cash.

27 42. One such example of criminals using PII for profit is the development of “Fullz”
28 packages.

1 43. Cybercriminals can cross-reference two sources of PII to marry unregulated data
2 available elsewhere to criminally stolen data with an astonishingly complete scope and degree of
3 accuracy in order to assemble complete dossiers on individuals. These dossiers are known as “Fullz”
4 packages.

5 44. The development of “Fullz” packages means that stolen PII from the Data Breach can
6 easily be used to link and identify it to Plaintiff and the proposed Class’s phone numbers, email
7 addresses, and other unregulated sources and identifiers. In other words, even if certain information
8 such as emails, phone numbers, or credit card numbers may not be included in the PII stolen by the
9 cybercriminals in the Data Breach, criminals can easily create a Fullz package and sell it at a higher
10 price to unscrupulous operators and criminals (such as illegal and scam telemarketers) over and over.
11 That is exactly what is happening to Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class, and it is
12 reasonable for any trier of fact, including this Court or a jury, to find that Plaintiff and other
13 members of the proposed Class’s stolen PII is being misused, and that such misuse is fairly traceable
14 to the Data Breach.

15 45. Defendant disclosed the PII of Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class for
16 criminals to use in the conduct of criminal activity. Specifically, Defendant opened up, disclosed,
17 and exposed the PII of Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class to people engaged in disruptive
18 and unlawful business practices and tactics, including online account hacking, unauthorized use of
19 financial accounts, and fraudulent attempts to open unauthorized financial accounts (i.e., identity
20 fraud), all using the stolen PII.

21 46. Defendant’s failure to properly notify Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class of
22 the Data Breach exacerbated Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class’s injury by depriving them
23 of the earliest ability to take appropriate measures to protect their PII and take other necessary steps
24 to mitigate the harm caused by the Data Breach.

25 **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

26 47. Under Cal. Code Civ. P. § 382, Plaintiff sues on behalf of herself and the proposed
27 Class (“Class”), defined as follows:

28 All individuals residing in the State of California whose PII was

1 compromised in the Data Breach disclosed by Meyer in February 2022.

2 Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its agents, affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, any entity in
3 which Defendant has a controlling interest, any Defendant officer or director, any successor or
4 assign, and any Judge who adjudicates this case, including their staff and immediate family.

5 48. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition.

6 49. *Ascertainability.* Meyer has identified, or is able to identify, all individuals affected by
7 the data breach. These records will identify the Class Members.

8 50. *Numerosity.* The class includes at least 2,747 class members, so individual joinder
9 would be impracticable.

10 51. *Well-Defined Community of Interest.* The class constitutes a well-defined community of
11 interest, as demonstrated by the predominance of common issues, the typicality of Plaintiffs' claims
12 to those of the class, the adequacy of Plaintiffs and their counsel as class representatives, and the
13 superiority of representative litigation to individual joinder.

14 a. **Commonality and Predominance.** This case presents questions of law and fact
15 common to all class members, and those common questions predominate over
16 individualized issues. These common questions include:

- 17 i. Whether Defendant had a duty to use reasonable care in safeguarding
18 Plaintiff and the Class's PII;
- 19 ii. Whether Defendant failed to implement and maintain reasonable
20 security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and scope of
21 the information compromised in the Data Breach;
- 22 iii. Whether Defendant was negligent in maintaining, protecting, and
23 securing PII;
- 24 iv. Whether Defendant breached contractual promises to safeguard Plaintiff
25 and the Class's PII;
- 26 v. Whether Defendant took reasonable measures to determine the extent of
27 the Data Breach after discovering it;
- 28 vi. Whether Defendant's Breach Notice was reasonable;

- vii. Whether the Data Breach caused Plaintiff and the Class injuries;
- viii. What the proper damages measure is; and
- ix. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to damages, treble damages, or injunctive relief.

b. **Typicality.** Plaintiff's claims are typical of Class member's claims as each arises from the same Data Breach, the same alleged violations by Defendant, and the same unreasonable manner of notifying individuals about the Data Breach.

c. **Adequacy.** Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the proposed Class's interests. Her interests do not conflict with Class members' interests and she has retained counsel experienced in complex class action litigation and data privacy to prosecute this action on the Class's behalf, including as lead counsel.

d. **Superiority.** Further, common questions of law and fact predominate over any individualized questions, and a class action is superior to individual litigation or any other available method to fairly and efficiently adjudicate the controversy. The damages available to individuals are insufficient to make individual lawsuits economically feasible.

COUNT I

Negligence

(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

52. Plaintiff realleges all previous paragraphs as if fully set forth below.

53. Plaintiff and members of the Class entrusted their PII to Defendant. Defendant owed to Plaintiff and other members of the Class a duty to exercise reasonable care in handling and using the PII in its care and custody, including by implementing industry-standard security procedures sufficient to reasonably protect the information from the Data Breach, theft, and unauthorized use that came to pass, and to promptly detect attempts at unauthorized access.

54. Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff and members of the Class because it was foreseeable that Defendant's failure to adequately safeguard their PII in accordance with state-of-the-art industry standards concerning data security would result in the compromise of that PII—just like the Data Breach that ultimately came to pass. Defendant acted with wanton and reckless

1 disregard for the security and confidentiality of Plaintiff's and members of the Class's PII by
2 disclosing and providing access to this information to third parties and by failing to properly
3 supervise both the way the PII was stored, used, and exchanged, and those in its employ who were
4 responsible for making that happen.

5 55. Defendant owed to Plaintiff and members of the Class a duty to notify them within a
6 reasonable timeframe of any breach to the security of their PII. Defendant also owed a duty to timely
7 and accurately disclose to Plaintiff and members of the Class the scope, nature, and occurrence of
8 the Data Breach. This duty is required and necessary for Plaintiff and members of the Class to take
9 appropriate measures to protect their PII, to be vigilant in the face of an increased risk of harm, and
10 to take other necessary steps to mitigate the harm caused by the Data Breach.

11 56. Defendant owed these duties to Plaintiff and members of the Class because they are
12 members of a well-defined, foreseeable, and probable class of individuals whom Defendant knew or
13 should have known would suffer injury-in-fact from Defendant's inadequate security protocols.
14 Defendant actively sought and obtained Plaintiff's and members of the Class's personal information
15 and PII.

16 57. The risk that unauthorized persons would attempt to gain access to the PII and misuse it
17 was foreseeable. Given that Defendant holds vast amounts of PII, it was inevitable that unauthorized
18 individuals would attempt to access Defendant's databases containing the PII—whether by malware
19 or otherwise.

20 58. PII is highly valuable, and Defendant knew, or should have known, the risk in
21 obtaining, using, handling, emailing, and storing the PII of Plaintiff and members of the Class and
22 the importance of exercising reasonable care in handling it.

23 59. Defendant breached its duties by failing to exercise reasonable care in supervising its
24 agents, contractors, vendors, and suppliers, and in handling and securing the personal information
25 and PII of Plaintiff and members of the Class which actually and proximately caused the Data
26 Breach and Plaintiff's and members of the Class's injury.

27 60. Defendant further breached its duties by failing to provide reasonably timely notice of
28 the Data Breach to Plaintiff and members of the Class, which actually and proximately caused and

1 exacerbated the harm from the Data Breach and Plaintiff’s and members of the Class’s injuries-in-
2 fact.

3 61. As a direct and traceable result of Defendant’s negligence and/or negligent supervision,
4 Plaintiff and members of the Class have suffered or will suffer damages, including monetary
5 damages, increased risk of future harm, embarrassment, humiliation, frustration, and emotional
6 distress.

7 62. Defendant’s breach of its common-law duties to exercise reasonable care and its
8 failures and negligence actually and proximately caused Plaintiff and members of the Class actual,
9 tangible, injury-in-fact and damages, including, without limitation, the theft of their PII by criminals,
10 improper disclosure of their PII, lost benefit of their bargain, lost value of their PII, and lost time and
11 money incurred to mitigate and remediate the effects of the Data Breach that resulted from and were
12 caused by Defendant’s negligence, which injury-in-fact and damages are ongoing, imminent,
13 immediate, and which they continue to face.

14 **COUNT II**

15 **Negligence Per Se**

16 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

17 63. Plaintiff and members of the Class incorporate the above allegations as if fully set forth
18 herein.

19 64. Pursuant to the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, Defendant had a duty to provide fair and
20 adequate computer systems and data security practices to safeguard Plaintiff’s and members of the
21 Class’s PII.

22 65. Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair . . . practices in or affecting commerce,”
23 including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair act or practice by businesses, such as
24 Defendant, of failing to use reasonable measures to protect customers or, in this case, employees’
25 PII. The FTC publications and orders promulgated pursuant to the FTC Act also form part of the
26 basis of Defendant’s duty to protect Plaintiff’s and the members of the Class’s sensitive PII.

27 66. Defendant violated its duty under Section 5 of the FTC Act by failing to use reasonable
28 measures to protect its employees’ PII and not complying with applicable industry standards as

1 described in detail herein. Defendant's conduct was particularly unreasonable given the nature and
2 amount of PII Defendant had collected and stored and the foreseeable consequences of a data
3 breach, including, specifically, the immense damages that would result to its employees in the event
4 of a breach, which ultimately came to pass.

5 67. The harm that has occurred is the type of harm the FTC Act is intended to guard
6 against. Indeed, the FTC has pursued numerous enforcement actions against businesses that, because
7 of their failure to employ reasonable data security measures and avoid unfair and deceptive
8 practices, caused the same harm as that suffered by Plaintiff and members of the Class.

9 68. Defendant had a duty to Plaintiff and the members of the Class to implement and
10 maintain reasonable security procedures and practices to safeguard Plaintiff and the Class's PII.

11 69. Defendant breached its respective duties to Plaintiff and members of the Class under
12 the FTC Act by failing to provide fair, reasonable, or adequate computer systems and data security
13 practices to safeguard Plaintiff and members of the Class's PII.

14 70. Defendant's violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act and its failure to comply with
15 applicable laws and regulations constitutes negligence per se.

16 71. But for Defendant's wrongful and negligent breach of its duties owed to Plaintiff and
17 members of the Class, Plaintiff and members of the Class would not have been injured.

18 72. The injury and harm suffered by Plaintiff and members of the Class were the
19 reasonably foreseeable result of Defendant's breach of its duties. Defendant knew or should have
20 known that Defendant was failing to meet its duties and that its breach would cause Plaintiff and
21 members of the Class to suffer the foreseeable harms associated with the exposure of their PII.

22 73. Had Plaintiff and members of the Class known that Defendant would not adequately
23 protect their PII, Plaintiff and members of the Class would not have entrusted Defendant with their
24 PII.

25 74. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence per se, Plaintiff and
26 members of the Class have suffered harm, including loss of time and money resolving fraudulent
27 charges; loss of time and money obtaining protections against future identity theft; lost control over
28 the value of their PII; unreimbursed losses relating to fraudulent charges; losses relating to

1 exceeding credit and debit card limits and balances; harm resulting from damaged credit scores and
2 information; and other harm resulting from the unauthorized use or threat of unauthorized use of
3 stolen personal information, entitling them to damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

4 **COUNT III**

5 **Breach of an Implied Contract**

6 **(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

7 75. Plaintiff and members of the Class incorporate the above allegations as if fully set forth
8 herein.

9 76. Defendant offered to employ Plaintiff and members of the Class in exchange for their
10 PII.

11 77. In turn, and through internal policies, Defendant agreed it would not disclose the PII it
12 collects to unauthorized persons. Defendant also promised to safeguard employee PII.

13 78. Plaintiff and the members of the Class accepted Defendant's offer by providing PII to
14 Defendant in exchange for employment with Defendant.

15 79. Implicit in the parties' agreement was that Defendant would provide Plaintiff and
16 members of the Class with prompt and adequate notice of all unauthorized access and/or theft of
17 their PII.

18 80. Plaintiff and the members of the Class would not have entrusted their PII to Defendant
19 in the absence of such agreement with Defendant.

20 81. Defendant materially breached the contract(s) it had entered with Plaintiff and members
21 of the Class by failing to safeguard such information and failing to notify them promptly of the
22 intrusion into its computer systems that compromised such information. Defendant further breached
23 the implied contracts with Plaintiff and members of the Class by:

24 a. Failing to properly safeguard and protect Plaintiff and members of the Class's PII;

25 b. Failing to comply with industry standards as well as legal obligations that are
26 necessarily incorporated into the parties' agreement; and

27 c. Failing to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of electronic PII that Defendant
28 created, received, maintained, and transmitted.

1 92. Defendant appreciated or had knowledge of the benefits conferred upon itself by
2 Plaintiff and members of the Class.

3 93. Under principals of equity and good conscience, Defendant should not be permitted to
4 retain the full value of Plaintiff and the proposed Class’s services and their PII because Defendant
5 failed to adequately protect their PII. Plaintiff and the proposed Class would not have provided their
6 PII or worked for Defendant at the payrates they did had they known Defendant would not
7 adequately protect their PII.

8 94. Defendant should be compelled to disgorge into a common fund for the benefit of
9 Plaintiff and members of the Class all unlawful or inequitable proceeds received by it because of its
10 misconduct and Data Breach.

11 **COUNT V**

12 **Violation of California’s Consumer Records Act**

13 **Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.80, *et seq.***

14 **(On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

15 95. Plaintiff and members of the Class incorporate the above allegations as if fully set forth
16 herein.

17 96. Under California law, any “person or business that conducts business in California, and
18 that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal information” must “disclose any
19 breach of the system following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data to
20 any resident of California whose unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to
21 have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.” (Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82.) The disclosure must
22 “be made in the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay” (*Id.*), but
23 “immediately following discovery [of the breach], if the personal information was, or is reasonably
24 believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.” (Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82, subdiv. b.)

25 97. The Data Breach constitutes a “breach of the security system” of Defendant.

26 98. An unauthorized person acquired the personal, unencrypted information of Plaintiff and
27 the Class.

28 99. Defendant knew that an unauthorized person had acquired the personal, unencrypted

1 information of Plaintiff and the Class, but waited approximately three months to notify them. Three
2 months is an unreasonable delay under the circumstances.

3 100. Defendant's unreasonable delay prevented Plaintiff and the Class from taking
4 appropriate measures from protecting themselves against harm.

5 101. Because Plaintiff and the Class were unable to protect themselves, they suffered
6 incrementally increased damages that they would not have suffered with timelier notice.

7 102. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to equitable relief and damages in an amount to be
8 determined at trial.

9
10 **COUNT VI**

11 **Violation of California's Unfair Competition Law**

12 **Cal. Bus. Code § 17200, *et seq.***

13 **(On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)**

14 103. Plaintiff and members of the Class incorporate the above allegations as if fully set forth
15 herein.

16 104. Defendant engaged in unlawful and unfair business practices in violation of Cal. Bus.
17 & Prof. Code § 17200, *et seq.* which prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or
18 practices ("UCL").

19 105. Defendant's conduct is unlawful because it violates the California Consumer Privacy
20 Act of 2018, Civ. Code § 1798.100, *et seq.* (the "CCPA"), and other state data security laws.

21 106. Defendant stored the PII of Plaintiff and the Class in its computer systems and knew or
22 should have known it did not employ reasonable, industry standard, and appropriate security
23 measures that complied with applicable regulations and that would have kept Plaintiff's and the
24 Class's PII secure so as to prevent the loss or misuse of that PII.

25 107. Defendant failed to disclose to Plaintiff and the Class that their PII was not secure.
26 However, Plaintiff and the Class were entitled to assume, and did assume, that Defendant had
27 secured their PII. At no time were Plaintiff and the Class on notice that their PII was not secure,
28 which Defendant had a duty to disclose.

1 108. Defendant also violated California Civil Code § 1798.150 by failing to implement and
2 maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, resulting in an unauthorized access and
3 exfiltration, theft, or disclosure of Plaintiff’s and the Class’s nonencrypted and nonredacted PII.

4 109. Had Defendant complied with these requirements, Plaintiff and the Class would not
5 have suffered the damages related to the data breach.

6 110. Defendant’s conduct was unlawful, in that it violated the CCPA.

7 111. Defendant’s conduct was also unfair, in that it violated a clear legislative policy in
8 favor of protecting consumers from data breaches.

9 112. Defendant’s conduct is an unfair business practice under the UCL because it was
10 immoral, unethical, oppressive, and unscrupulous and caused substantial harm. This conduct
11 includes employing unreasonable and inadequate data security despite its business model of actively
12 collecting PII.

13 113. Defendant also engaged in unfair business practices under the “tethering test.” Its
14 actions and omissions, as described above, violated fundamental public policies expressed by the
15 California Legislature. *See, e.g.*, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.1 (“The Legislature declares that . . . all
16 individuals have a right of privacy in information pertaining to them . . . The increasing use of
17 computers . . . has greatly magnified the potential risk to individual privacy that can occur from the
18 maintenance of personal information.”); Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5(a) (“It is the intent of the
19 Legislature to ensure that personal information about California residents is protected.”); Cal. Bus.
20 & Prof. Code § 22578 (“It is the intent of the Legislature that this chapter [including the Online
21 Privacy Protection Act] is a matter of statewide concern.”). Defendant’s acts and omissions thus
22 amount to a violation of the law.

23 114. Instead, Defendant made the PII of Plaintiff and the Class accessible to scammers,
24 identity thieves, and other malicious actors, subjecting Plaintiff and the Class to an impending risk of
25 identity theft. Additionally, Defendant’s conduct was unfair under the UCL because it violated the
26 policies underlying the laws set out in the prior paragraph.

27 115. As a result of those unlawful and unfair business practices, Plaintiff and the Class
28 suffered an injury-in-fact and have lost money or property.

1 116. The injuries to Plaintiff and the Class greatly outweigh any alleged countervailing
2 benefit to consumers or competition under all of the circumstances.

3 117. There were reasonably available alternatives to further Defendant's legitimate business
4 interests, other than the misconduct alleged in this complaint.

5 118. Therefore, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to equitable relief, including restitution of
6 all monies paid to or received by Defendant; disgorgement of all profits accruing to Defendant
7 because of its unfair and improper business practices; a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant's
8 unlawful and unfair business activities; and any other equitable relief the Court deems proper.

9 **COUNT VII**

10 **Violation of the California Consumer Privacy Act ("CCPA"), Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.150**

11 **(On behalf of Plaintiff and the Proposed Class)**

12 119. Plaintiff and members of the Class incorporate the above allegations as if fully set forth
13 herein.

14 120. Defendant violated California Civil Code § 1798.150 of the CCPA by failing to
15 implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the
16 information to protect the nonencrypted PII of Plaintiff and the Class. As a direct and proximate
17 result, Plaintiff's, and the Class's nonencrypted and nonredacted PII was subject to unauthorized
18 access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure.

19 121. Defendant is a business organized for the profit and financial benefit of its owners
20 according to California Civil Code § 1798.140, that collects the personal information of its
21 employees and whose annual gross revenues exceed the threshold established by California Civil
22 Code § 1798.140(d).

23 122. Plaintiff and class members seek injunctive or other equitable relief to ensure
24 Defendant hereinafter adequately safeguards PII by implementing reasonable security procedures
25 and practices. Such relief is particularly important because Defendant continues to hold PII,
26 including Plaintiff's and Class members' PII. Plaintiff and Class members have an interest in
27 ensuring that their PII is reasonably protected, and Defendant has demonstrated a pattern of failing
28 to adequately safeguard this information.

1 I. Granting Plaintiff and the Class leave to amend this complaint to conform to the
2 evidence produced at trial; and

3 J. Granting such other or further relief as may be appropriate under the circumstances.

4 **JURY DEMAND**

5 Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.
6
7
8

9 Dated: June 16, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

11 By: /s/ Michael J. Boyle, Jr.

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